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Abstract
Increasing inequality and associated egalitarian sentiments have again put redistribution
on the political agenda. Support for redistribution may also be affected by altruistic and
egalitarian preferences, but knowledge about the distribution of these preferences in the
broader population and how they relate to political support for redistributive policies is still
scarce. In this paper, we take advantage of Swiss direct democracy, where people voted
several times in national plebiscites on strongly redistributive policies, to study the link
between other-regarding preferences and support for redistribution in a broad sample of the
Swiss population. Based on a recently developed non-parametric clustering procedure, we
identify three disjunct groups of individuals with fundamentally different other-regarding
preferences: (i) a large share of inequality averse people, (ii) a somewhat smaller yet still
large share of people with an altruistic concern for social welfare and the worse off, and
(iii) a considerable minority of primarily selfish individuals. Controlling for a large number
of determinants of support for redistribution, we document that inequality aversion and
altruistic concerns play an important role for redistributive voting that is particularly
pronounced for above-median income earners. However, the role of these motives differs
depending on the nature of redistributive proposals. Inequality aversion has large and robust
effects in plebiscites that demand income reductions for the rich, while altruistic concerns
play no significant role in these plebiscites.
Key Words: Social Preferences, Altruism, Inequality Aversion, Preference Heterogeneity, De-
mand for Redistribution
JEL Codes: D31, D72, H23, H24
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1 Introduction
Rising income inequality and the extremely high and salient incomes of top executives have
again put income redistribution on the political agenda. In the US, for example, almost all
candidates in the democratic presidential primary for the 2020 elections propose plans that
involve substantial changes in the distribution of income.1 Likewise, left-leaning parties in
Germany and the UK support various redistributive measures, and Switzerland held four
radically redistributive national plebiscites2 during the last 10 years. One of these plebiscites
would have implemented – if supported by a majority – a law that constrains the maximal
ratio between the lowest and the highest incomes in a company to 1:12, i.e., a CEO could not
have earned more than 12 times the wage of, say, a janitor. Although this initiative did not
pass, it was nevertheless supported by a non-negligible share (34.7%) of the voters.
What motivates citizens to support redistributive policy proposals? Clearly, households
with low current and expected future incomes that may benefit economically from redistribu-
tion have a self-interested reason to support them, but affluent households often also support
redistributive measures. This suggests that other-regarding (i.e., “social”) preferences – the
weight individuals put on other people’s incomes – may also play a role. In this paper, we
examine the extent and the ways in which other-regarding preferences support redistributive
policy proposals. We are, in particular, also interested in how the fundamental properties of
voters’ other-regarding preferences (e.g., their concern for the worse off versus their concern
for equality) inform us about the specific type of redistribution that they support. For ex-
ample, voters whose social preferences are characterized by a concern for the worse off may
show little support for proposals with the primary goal to tax the rich, while inequality averse
voters may well support such a proposal.
Our study is motivated by experimental and field evidence suggesting that a non-
negligible share of subjects displays a concern for social welfare and the worse off (e.g.,
Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fisman
et al., 2007, 2015; DellaVigna et al., 2012) or for equality (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Dawes et al., 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008). To date, knowledge about the
overall distribution of social preferences like inequality aversion and social welfare concerns
in the adult population and the extent to which they are related to actual political support for
redistributive proposals is still relatively rare (though see Fisman et al., 2017; Kerschbamer
and Mu¨ller, 2020; Alma˚s et al., 2019).
1Almost all democratic candidates support a doubling of the federal minimum wage, a substantial increase
in health care provision, and universal nationally paid family and medical leave programs. And a substantial
number of them support new and/or considerably increased taxation of rich households.
2Plebiscites are also called “popular initiatives”. We use the two terms interchangeably.
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We measure social preferences in a sample of the Swiss population (n ≈ 800) that is
broadly representative for the German and French speaking part of Switzerland – which
comprises 90% of the Swiss population – in terms of age, gender, geographical area, income,
and education. We focus on Switzerland because, as we argue below, the direct democratic in-
stitutions of this country offer several advantages in studying the role of social preferences for
redistributive policy. We elicit other-regarding preferences using a large set of incentivized
choice situations where respondents have to decide how to allocate money between them-
selves and another participant of the study. Based on individuals’ overall behavior, we iden-
tify a small number of distinct preference classes using a novel Bayesian non-parametric clus-
tering method (Kulis and Jordan, 2012) that requires neither assumptions about pre-existing
social preferences nor assumptions about the error (noise) structure.3 This Bayesian procedure
infers the prevailing social preference types in the population using only the subjects’ overall
behavioral patterns in the money allocation task, and endogenously assigns each individual
to one of the identified types. We then link individuals’ assignments to social preference
types to their political support for four different redistributive plebiscites – the 1:12 initiative,
an initiative to increase tax rates for rich citizens (“fair taxes initiative”), the minimum wage
initiative and the initiative for an unconditional basic income. We measure political support
in an online survey and our regressions linking social preferences to political support con-
trol for large number of socio-demographic characteristics and other determinants of policy
preferences previously discussed in the literature (e.g., in Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Piketty,
1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001; Fong, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013; Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et
al., 2017; Alesina et al., 2018).
The Swiss direct democratic set-up offers several advantages for studying voters’ support
for redistribution. First, it unbundles redistributive proposals from other policy goals that
may confound the voters’ support for redistribution. In a representative democracy, people
do not vote on specific redistributive policy proposals. Instead, they can only vote for par-
ties or candidates. However, parties and candidates always represent a bundle of different
policy proposals. It is, therefore, not clear whether voters support a candidate because of
her position on redistribution or because of other aspects in her program (e.g., foreign policy,
religion, abortion, etc.). In contrast, every voter or civic organization under the Swiss direct
democratic institutions can initiate a national plebiscite for a particular redistributive policy
3While the advantages of being able to infer preference classes and individuals’ assignment to classes without
constraints on the structure of utility functions are transparent, the advantage of avoiding assumptions about the
structure of error terms (i.e., utility noise) seem less obvious. However, it has been shown in the domain of risk
preferences that assumptions about the utility noise in random utility models are not innocuous. For instance,
Buschena and Zilberman (2000) showed that assuming homoscedastic errors for the same data set supports
non-expected utility models, while expected utility models cannot be improved upon when heteroscedasticity
is allowed.
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if they can collect at least 100’000 signatures in support of it.4
Second, in a national plebiscite, voters can decide about a concrete amendment to the
constitution such that – if a majority supports the proposal – the change becomes effective.5
The voters thus know that exactly this change will be implemented if a majority supports
it. In other words, once an initiative is up for vote, there is little opportunity for opaque
backroom deals that involve unknown implicit promises between politicians that increase the
overall cost of the redistributive policy.6 This also means that general distrust of politics and
the government is less likely to play a mitigating role in people’s support for redistributive
policies in Switzerland. This aspect is important in light of recent work showing that such
mistrust reduces general support for redistributive policies (Kuziemko et al., 2015). In the
presence of such mistrust, people with other-regarding preferences (e.g., a concern for the
poor) may not support politically enforced redistribution.
Finally, the fact that we elicit individuals’ support for redistributive proposals that are
identical or very similar to previous national plebiscites allows us to validate the aggregate
support for the policies expressed in our survey with the aggregate support that this policy
actually received in previous plebiscites. For example, by correlating the actual support for a
policy in the plebiscite across municipalities or geographic regions with the expressed support
in the survey, we can assess the external validity of the survey responses. In addition, we
also validate the survey responses by giving individuals the option to donate real money to
organizations that support or oppose redistribution. Both validation exercises support the
view that the survey responses provide us with valid information about individuals’ political
support for redistribution.
The application of the Bayesian non-parametric clustering approach to people’s choices
in the money allocation task indicates the existence of three fundamentally different classes of
other-regarding preferences in our population. A large share of individuals (≈ 50%) makes
predominantly egalitarian choices, i.e., they indicate that they care about equality in addition
to their self-interest. In the domain of advantageous inequality, i.e., when the available payoff
allocations give them a higher payoff compared to the individual with whom they are paired,
these subjects are willing to sacrifice some of their own payoff to increase equality. Likewise,
in the domain of disadvantageous inequality, where the other individual has generally a
higher payoff, they are willing to reduce the other individual’s payoff at a cost to themselves
if this leads to more equality. Thus, merely by inspecting the behavioral patterns of this
group – and without making structural assumptions about utility functions and noise – these
4For a more detailed description of Swiss direct democracy see Funk (2010), Funk and Gathmann (2011) or
Funk and Gathmann (2011).
5The 12:1 initiative proposed, for example, an additional paragraph in the Swiss constitution that contained
the following formulation: “The highest paid wage in a firm must not be higher than twelve times the lowest
wage paid by this firm”.
6In representative democracies, unrelated laws and spending bills are often linked during such negotiations,
which lead to so called “Christmas tree legislation”, “pork-barreling” and other forms of vote buying.
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individuals can be classified as inequality averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).7
The second largest group, comprising roughly 35% of our sample, displays a strikingly
different other-regarding pattern. These individuals are basically never willing to reduce the
other player’s payoff even if the other player receives much more. Moreover, these individ-
uals are to a large degree willing to transfer money to the other player if the other player’s
monetary gain is higher than their own monetary cost, i.e., if the transfer increases the sum
of payoffs – and they do so even if that increases inequality. In addition, many of these
individuals are also willing to increase the other player’s payoff in the domain of advanta-
geous inequality even if this reduces the overall pie, thus showing a concern for the worse
off. Their behavior is therefore very consistent with a concern for social welfare and the worse
off as defined by Charness and Rabin (2002) as well as with other-regarding CES-preferences
that incorporate an equity-efficiency trade-off as modelled by Fisman et al. (2007, 2015).8 For
simplicity, we label this type as motivated by altruistic social welfare concerns. Finally, the third
type is characterized by predominantly self-interested individuals who generally do not care
much about the others’ payoffs. These individuals comprise roughly 15% of the sample.
To examine the role of inequality aversion and social welfare concerns in redistributive
politics, we construct an aggregate index of support for redistribution by averaging an in-
dividual’s support for redistribution over all four redistributive plebiscites. In addition, we
elicited individuals’ support for a placebo plebiscite – a national plebiscite that does not in-
volve any redistributive issues9. Therefore, if our social preference measures are specific to
issues of distribution, they should play no role in the placebo plebiscite.
Our results show that both inequality aversion and social welfare concerns play a substan-
tial role in individuals’ support for redistribution – even after controlling for a large battery
of covariates. On average, inequality averse individuals are 11 percentage points more likely
to vote in favor of redistribution compared to predominantly selfish individuals and indi-
viduals with social welfare concerns are 9 percentage points more likely to favor political
redistribution. The magnitude of these effects is large when we compare it with the role
7Two of the authors of this paper have also been involved in measuring individuals’ social preferences, and as-
signing them into different preference types with the same Bayesian non-parametric procedure, in a large sample
of the Danish population (n ≈ 4000). The same three preference classes as identified in the Swiss population also
show up in the Danish population although the size of the different preference classes is different. For example,
the share of inequality averse individuals in the Danish sample is “only” roughly 35%.
8In the model of Charness and Rabin (2002), individuals care for their own payoff, the sum of payoffs, and
the payoff of the worse-off individual (in the two-person case). The CES approach to other-regarding preferences
(Fisman et al., 2007, 2015) is sufficiently general to incorporate Charness-Rabin preferences because it allows for (i)
the extreme case where the individual cares only for his/her own payoff and the sum of payoffs, (ii) the extreme
case where he/she only cares for equality (the “Rawlsian” case) in the sense that the individual is willing to give
up resources to increase the other player’s payoff, and (iii) any combination of (i) and (ii). Note, however, that
other-regarding CES preferences do not capture inequality aversion because they rule out individuals that are
willing to pay to reduce another’s income for the sake of achieving equality.
9The placebo plebiscite intended to change how federal judges are selected.
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played by other covariates. For example, individuals with an income below the median are
about 7 percentage points more likely to support redistribution than individuals earning an
income above the median. In contrast, social preferences do not affect support for the placebo
plebiscite, suggesting that they specifically capture distributive concerns.
In a further step, we examine whether the role of social preferences is income-dependent.
We hypothesize that the effect of other-regarding preferences might be diluted among in-
dividuals with lower incomes, as they typically have selfish reasons to favor redistribution.
If self-interest already induces individuals with lower incomes to vote disproportionately
strongly for redistribution, then other-regarding preferences may not add much to this de-
cision. It might therefore be difficult to identify a differential effect of social preferences for
low-income individuals. In contrast, selfish motives and other-regarding preferences make
opposing predictions for affluent individuals: Since affluent individuals will most likely have
to pay for redistribution, they have a selfish reason to oppose it. However, they might en-
dorse more redistribution if they are sufficiently averse to inequality or have a concern for the
worse off, even if this is costly for them. We show that this is indeed the case. While social
preferences do not significantly predict political support for redistribution among individuals
with an income below the median, they have a very strong effect among individuals with an
income above the median. More specifically, affluent (i.e., above median income) individuals
who are inequality averse are about 20 percentage points more supportive of redistribution
than affluent individuals who are predominantly selfish. Likewise, affluent individuals with
a concern for social welfare are 13 percentage points more supportive of redistribution than
affluent individuals who are predominantly selfish.
Finally, our results also indicate how insights into the fundamental properties of social
preferences can help us better understand the nature of the support for specific redistribu-
tive policy proposals. In particular, inequality concerns and social welfare concerns diverge
sharply with regard to redistribution that is primarily perceived as being about reducing the
income of the rich. We would thus expect inequality averse individuals to support national
plebiscites that primarily aim at constraining the incomes of the rich, while those who are
motivated by social welfare concerns have less reason to vote for them. In fact, this conjecture
receives considerable support in our data.
Our paper contributes and is related to different bodies of research. It is, first, related to
the large literature on social preferences mentioned above and, in particular, the literature on
the structural estimation of the overall distribution of social preferences in broad population
samples (e.g. Bellemare et al., 2008, 2011; Fisman et al., 2015), and the literature that relates
social preferences to issues of political economy (e.g. Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006; Dawes et
al., 2012; Durante et al., 2014; Fisman et al., 2017; Kerschbamer and Mu¨ller, 2020; Alma˚s et al.,
2019). However, none of these studies examined the role of social preferences on redistributive
proposals that were actually up for voting in real referenda where subjects could express their
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voting preferences with regard to widely discussed and specific redistributive proposals.10
We also differ from this literature by providing a parsimonious classification of individu-
als to endogenously determined behavioral types that enables a characterization of the distri-
bution of social preferences in terms of individuals’ assignment to a small number of disjunct
preference groups. While the previous structural estimation literature made assumptions on
pre-existing preferences such as inequity aversion (Bellemare et al., 2008), intention-based
reciprocity (Bellemare et al., 2011), or other-regarding CES preferences (Fisman et al., 2015,
2017), the application of a non-parametric clustering method makes it possible to identify the
fundamental behavioral patterns of disjunct preference groups without structural assump-
tions on preferences and noise. In this context, we also show that a good segregation into
disjunct preference types can be achieved with a rather small number of choice problems.
While our clustering results are based on 14 choice problems in the current study, we show in
the appendix that 4-5 choice problems are already sufficient to achieve a good approximation
of the distribution of social preferences. In fact, the role of social preferences in redistribu-
tive voting remains very similar if one applies the clustering method to a smaller number of
choice problems. We therefore believe that the method we used can be applied productively
in future research on social preferences in large population samples (where survey time and
space is often tightly constrained). It may even be possible to extend it to determine the type
distribution for other preference domains (e.g., risk and time preferences).
Second, our study contributes and is related to the growing body of research that exam-
ines the empirical determinants of demand for redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011,
for a review). This literature has proposed and identified a list of important factors in the
demand for redistribution: individuals’ current income as well as future income prospects
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), beliefs and biases regarding income mobility (Piketty, 1995;
Benabou and Ok, 2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Alesina et al., 2018), beliefs about whether
luck or effort are primarily responsible for individual success (e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005), a history of personal misfortune (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013), mistrust
in politicians and the government (Kuziemko et al., 2015), individuals’ risk aversion (Ga¨rtner
et al., 2017), beliefs and biases about the prevailing income distribution and individuals’ rel-
ative income standing (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017), or belonging to demographic
groups (such as the elderly and African-Americans in the US) that have become more averse
10Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) and Durante et al. (2014) examine the role of social preferences on the demand
for redistribution in laboratory voting games. Dawes et al. (2012) relate subjects’ decisions in a single dictator
game to their party preferences and their self-reported classification on a political left-right scale. Fisman et al.
(2017) estimate individuals’ social preferences under the assumption that other-regarding preferences are CES and
relate these preferences to subjects’ self-reported voting for Obama in the 2012 presidential election. Kerschbamer
and Mu¨ller (2020) measure preferences with a method that generates 9 different social preference types. Then,
they relate these preferences to subjects’ answers to relatively general hypothetical questions such as “should the
government mitigate income differences?”. Alma˚s et al. (2019) show that there are substantial differences in social
preferences between Norwegians and US-Americans in a third-party redistribution game and relate these results
to differences in redistributive policies across the two countries.
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to redistribution over time (Ashok et al., 2015). However, none of these studies has measured
and examined the role of inequality aversion and altruistic concerns for social welfare in the
demand for redistribution. Thus, in view of the fact that these types of social preferences
appear to play a significant role and are widely present in the population, we believe that
our study contributes to this literature by providing an improved understanding of citizens’
political demand for redistribution.11
2 Research design
2.1 Institutional setting
Switzerland is a confederation of 26 member states that are called cantons. A key element
of the Swiss political system is direct democracy: adult Swiss citizens regularly vote on a
variety of specific topics. Votes take place at the national, cantonal, and municipal levels
and typically occur four times a year.12 Votes tend to be extensively covered in the media,
and debates about politics are very common between friends, family, and colleagues. Over
a period of 3-4 months before a national plebiscite, for example, the benefits and costs of
the proposed law change are widely discussed on TV, the newspapers, the social media,
and the general population. Each voter also receives a booklet with his or her ballot that
provides detailed information on the plebiscite, including the positions of the Swiss Federal
Council, the parliament, and the group that initiated the plebiscite about one month before
the vote. Therefore, voters are more likely to be informed about the benefits and the costs of
the proposal and how to weigh them towards the end of this deliberation period than at the
beginning because they have heard the various pros and cons multiple times.
The public discussion and deliberation that happens in the period before the vote also
tends to affect the voters’ support for the policy proposals. Very often, the aggregate opinion
of the voters declines considerably during this period, in particular for “populist” proposals
with high emotional appeal. This downward trend is often observed in national polls con-
11Our study also corroborates several findings from the literature mentioned in this paragraph. We also find,
for example, that individuals’ incomes, a history of unemployment, or not being in the labor force matter for their
political support for redistribution. In addition, individuals’ views about the sources (i.e., luck versus effort) of
success and mistrust in politicians have a sizeable influence on their support for political redistribution.
12There are two different types of votes: plebiscites (also called popular initiatives) and referenda. A plebiscite is a
proposal to amend the constitution. Any member of the electorate can launch an initiative. For an initiative to be
put to vote, it must first receive the support of 100,000 eligible voters (i.e. 100,000 signatures) within 18 months.
In order to be accepted, a popular initiative needs to be accepted by a) the majority of the electorate and b) the
majority of the cantons (the so-called double majority). Referenda are votes that (might) automatically take place
when the parliament passes new laws. There are two type of referenda. An optional referendum can be launched
by a member of the Swiss electorate to oppose any law passed by the parliament. For an optional referendum to
be put to vote, it must first receive the support of 50,000 eligible voters (i.e. 50,000 signatures) within 100 days and
to be accepted, it needs to receive the votes of the majority of the Swiss citizens. A mandatory referendum typically
takes place when the parliament decides to amend the constitution. These modifications are automatically put to
vote and must be accepted by a double majority in order to be implemented.
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ducted with representative samples of swiss voters up to 2 months before the vote (see the
‘SRG-Trend’ surveys run by the institute gfs.bern). For example, the average support for the
four proposals that we included in our study (for details, see below) decreased from 41.5%
in the first representative survey of likely voters to 31% in the actual vote. In contrast, the
average opposition increased from 47.8% in the first survey to 69% in the actual vote. This
pattern suggests that the (perceived) cost of a redistributive policy may end up looming larger
than its perceived benefits after a long public deliberation. In our study, we exploit this fact
by reminding respondents of the previous plebiscites when we elicit their support for specific
proposals. This reminder can be viewed as a priming device that is likely to trigger the pros
and cons the individuals heard during the deliberation period, and move the elicited support
for the proposal closer to what individuals would actually vote in the plebiscite.
2.2 The online survey
The primary goal of the online survey was the measurement of social preferences and political
support for redistribution. In addition, we collect demographic information and measure
other important determinants of support for redistribution that have been identified in the
literature. We describe each of these measures separately below.
Measuring other-regarding preferences
We measured social preferences using a considerable number of money allocation tasks (“dic-
tator games”). In each dictator game, the participant had to decide how to allocate experi-
mental currency units (ECUs) between herself and an anonymous other participant of the
study. One choice situation was randomly chosen for payment at the end of the online survey
(with 100 ECUs = CHF 2.5). To make the trade-offs involved in a choice situation transpar-
ent, we represented the available choices numerically and graphically. Figure 1a provides
an example of how we presented a choice situation to the subjects. Each available allocation
consisted of a specific distribution of ECUs between the participant (bars labeled by “You re-
ceive”) and the other person (bars labeled by “other person receives”). The figure shows that
subjects could easily grasp the distributional and total payoff implications of the available
choice options. There were always seven interpersonal allocations (labeled by 1 to 7) available
per choice situation, and all of them were located on a budget line. Figure 1b plots the budget
line corresponding to the example depicted in Figure 1a in the “self-payoff (wown) – other’s
payoff (wother)” space. In this example, the slope of the budget line is -2, indicating that for
every ECU the dictator gives up, the other player receives 2 ECUs. Perfect equality in payoffs
can be achieved by choosing allocation 4.13
13Since the average amount of ECU’s at stake across all choice situations was roughly 750, the graphical repre-
sentation scaled all ECU amounts relative to 750 (i.e. 750 represented 100%). For example, a payoff of 950 was
represented by a (950/750) = 1.267 times larger bar than a payoff of 750.
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Figure 1: Example choice situation
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We used a subset of 14 dictator games to identify social preference types and the distribu-
tion of individuals across types. An additional set of dictator games were then used to assess
the validity of the identified types with out-of-sample predictions. The set of budget lines
used in the money allocation task is presented in Panel a of Figure 2. The budget lines asso-
ciated with these choice situations varied both in location and in slope. Precise information
on the different choice situations is given in Appendix A.1. The choice situations appeared in
individualized random order on subjects’ screens. It is noteworthy that some of the budget
lines involved an equal allocation of payoffs (e.g. (750, 750)) as an option, while others did
not. One key feature of the set of budget lines is that they have both positive and negative
slopes. Negatively sloped budget lines with different slopes enable us to measure individ-
uals’ willingness to pay to increase the other’s income, while positively sloped budget lines
make it possible to measure subjects’ willingness to pay to reduce others’ income for the sake
of, e.g., achieving a higher level of equality.
Another key feature of our design is that the set of budget lines comprises situations
in which the decision-maker is always (weakly) worse off (Figure 2c, north bundle) and sit-
uations in which she is always (weakly) better off than the other person (Figure 2d, south
bundle). The north bundle thus enables the measurement of social preferences in the domain
of disadvantageous (from the decision maker’s viewpoint) inequality, while the south bundle
allows for the identification of preferences in the domain of advantageous inequality.
To identify the different preference types and individuals’ assignments to types in our
broad population sample, we use the 14 budget lines in the center bundle (Figure 2b). We
focus on the center bundle for two reasons: First, by applying the Bayesian non-parametric
clustering method to choices in the center bundle, we can use the resulting preference types
to predict their behavior out-of-sample in the north and the south bundles. This prediction
exercise allows us to validate our behavioral interpretation of the emerging types. For ex-
ample, an inequality averse type who predominantly chooses the egalitarian allocation in the
center bundle should predominantly implement allocations that minimize inequality in the
south and the north bundles, even though this implies – for negatively sloped budget lines –
that subjects have to minimize their own payoff in the south bundle while they have to max-
imize their own payoff in the north bundle. Likewise, a preference type with a concern for
social welfare, i.e. one who does not care for equality but for the total payoff of both players,
should show this concern not only in the center bundle but also in the north bundle, where
disadvantageous inequality becomes very large.
Second, identifying the distribution of social preferences with a smaller set of choice
situations (i.e., the center bundle) can benefit the adoption of our methodology to settings
in which time is more constrained than in our study. The resulting preference types and
individuals’ assignment to types is most useful if behavior in the center bundle (or a subset
of that bundle) is predictive of what individuals will do elsewhere, i.e. for their behavior
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in choice situations in which they are always (weakly) better or worse off than the other
participant.
Measuring political support for redistributive proposals
We elicited respondents’ political support for four different redistributive proposals. The
precise wording of our political support questions is given in Appendix A.3. Two of the
proposals presented to the subjects were precisely identical to those that were put to vote in
earlier years, and two of them were very similar to earlier plebiscites, i.e., they differed only
in one parameter. Below we first describe the original popular initiatives. Then we describe
how two of our redistributive proposals differed relative to the original initiative.
The initiative for a fair tax code was put to vote in November 2010. The primary aim of this
initiative was to increase the marginal taxes rates for the rich in Switzerland’s “tax havens”.
In Switzerland, taxation occurs at three levels: federal, cantonal, and municipal. Some
cantons and some municipalities try to attract rich residents by proposing very low marginal
tax rates (both on income and on wealth) even for relatively rich people. The initiative
proposed to put an end to this form of tax competition at the cantonal and municipal level
by imposing a minimal marginal tax rate of 22% on all cantons and municipalities for taxable
annual incomes exceeding CHF 250,000. In addition, the initiative demanded a minimal
marginal tax rate of 0.5% on taxable wealth exceeding CHF 2 million. Thus, this popular
initiative – if accepted – would have substantially increased taxation of the richest 1-2% of
Switzerland’s taxpayers who are residents of regional or local “tax havens.”14
The 1 to 12 initiative was put to vote in November 2013. The aim of this initiative was
to make sure that the highest salary a company pays does not exceed 12 times its lowest
salary.15 Throughout the campaign, this initiative was largely described by its proponents as
an effective way of reducing the (“unfair”) salaries the top earners receive. The public debate
largely revolved around the salaries earned by the top managers, which are often perceived
as abusive, in particular when companies pay them in difficult financial situations. In the
official voting booklet edited by the government, the initiative committee motivated the need
for the proposed change with the example of an investment banker who received CHF 26
million upon arrival at a large Swiss bank that reported a loss of CHF 2.5 billion at the time.16
14At the time, all the municipalities of 8 cantons and some municipalities of 7 cantons had a marginal tax
rate on incomes exceeding CHF 250,000 lower than 22%. The Swiss fiscal authorities, based on numbers from
2007, estimated that 32,000 taxpayers (i.e. 1% of the taxpayers) had a taxable income in excess of CHF 250,000.
Similarly, in 2007 about 86,000 taxpayers had a wealth exceeding CHF 2 million. In some or all the municipalities
of 16 cantons, marginal tax on wealth exceeding CHF 2 million is lower than 0.5%.
15The initiative defined income as being both the salary as well as any other payment (in cash, in goods, or in
services) that are related to the work an employee does.
16“Last year, UBS lost CHF 2.5 billion. At the same time, bonuses exceeded CHF 2.5 billion. Investment banker
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The initiative for a minimum wage was put to vote in May 2014. The aim of this initiative
was to introduce a minimum wage of CHF 22 per hour worked, i.e. approximately CHF
4,000 per month (CHF 1 ≈ USD 1). This rather high minimum wage would have applied
to all workers in Switzerland, and would have been adjusted to the price index over
time.17 The public debate largely focused on the working poor. In the media, the initiative
committee regularly depicted the situation of workers who finished school and completed an
apprenticeship but who nevertheless earn very little. The proponents described the initiative
as an effective way to increase the salary of the poorest workers. In the official voting booklet,
the initiative committee argues “that 330,000 humans work hard to earn so little is disgraceful; a
real shame in a rich country.” (official voting booklet, p. 33).
The initiative for an unconditional basic income was put to vote in June 2016. The initiative
proposed the introduction of a universal basic income to be received by any Swiss citizen.
The proponents of the initiative considered an unconditional basic monthly income of CHF
2’500 per adult and CHF 625 per child as an appropriate first step.
We measured respondents’ attitudes towards these proposals by asking them to indicate
whether they would support or oppose these initiatives, should they be put to vote “this
weekend”. We described the content of each of these initiatives using a wording very similar
to that used in the official voting booklets distributed to every Swiss voter a few weeks before
each vote. The respondents could provide one of five possible answers: “Support”, “Rather
Support”, “Don’t Know”, “Rather Reject”, “Reject”. We use these answers as measures of
political support for each of the four initiatives described above.
We slightly changed the content of the proposed law change for two of the redistributive
popular initiatives – the 1:12 and the minimum wage initiative. Instead of eliciting subjects’
response to the 1:12 proposal and a CHF 4000 per month minimum wage, we asked them
for their response to a 1:20 proposal and a CHF 3000 per month minimum wage. The reason
for this was twofold. First, the overall support for 1:12 and for the minimum wage initiative
was not very high because they were perceived as very radical.18 We therefore made the
proposals less radical to increase the overall political support for redistribution. Second,
by explicitly pointing out this change in the survey we hoped that individuals – while still
priming their thoughts about the costs and benefits of the previous proposals – will reconsider
Andrea Orcel alone received CHF 25 million upon arrival at the bank. The average Swiss worker would need
to work 385 years to reach this amount.” (p. 11, official voting booklet). The proponents and the opponents of
popular initiatives can present their cases in the official voting booklet.
17At the time, it was estimated that approximately 330,000 individuals (close to 1 worker out of 10) earned less
than CHF 4,000 per month. (official voting booklet, p.28)
18The 1:12 initiative was accepted by 34.7% of the voters, and the minimum wage initiative was accepted by
23.7% of the voters.
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the costs/benefits ratio in such a way that they will not mechanically repeat their choices from
the previous national plebiscites. For example, support for the 1:20 proposal was measured
with the following question:
In November 2013, Switzerland voted on the 1:12 popular initiative. This initiative wanted to
constrain the inequality of wages within firms. The initiative demanded that the highest wage
paid in a company not exceed 12 times the lowest wage paid in the company. Suppose that
another national plebiscite takes place next weekend, but this time it is a 1:20 initiative, which
demands that the highest wage in a company may not exceed 20 times the lowest paid wage.
Would you support or reject this initiative? [Answer Categories: Support, Rather Support,
Don’t Know, Rather Reject, Reject]
Note that the four popular initiatives differ in terms of their primary goals. The 1:12 and the
fair taxes initiative were primarily framed and publicly discussed in terms of reducing income
inequality by either imposing higher taxes on the rich (fair taxes initiative) or by constraining
the top incomes in companies (1:12 initiative). Hence, a distaste for inequality might explain
support for these initiatives. Even individuals who must bear economic costs from redistribu-
tion might be willing to support these proposals, provided their distaste for inequality is large
enough. This focus on taking away money from the rich was basically absent in the minimum
wage initiative. The public discourse on the initiative for the unconditional basic income was,
however, also strongly focused on the implications for the public budget and the necessary
tax increases. Because voters’ perceptions about the primary goal of the initiatives is likely
to matter for their decisions, we also measured these perceptions in a follow-up survey (see
Section 4.5).
Measuring other determinants of political support for redistribution
Throughout the survey, we also collected a large set of additional covariates. Many of them
have been mentioned in the previous literature on the political demand for redistribution. As
the purpose of our study is to isolate the role played by social preferences, we use these mea-
sures as controls in our empirical analyses. However, they also provide further insights about
the role of these factors in a political setting that provides ideal conditions for studying the
demand for redistribution. The questions used to measure these covariates were distributed
throughout the survey, and we also used them to separate the money allocation task from the
different questions that measured individuals’ political support for the national plebiscites.
Details on the measurement of the different covariates can be found in Appendix A.3.
Socio-demographics. We collected data on respondents’ age, gender, income, marital status,
education, occupation, history of unemployment, and municipality of residence.
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Economic preferences and trust in people. We gathered data on four key economic pref-
erences—risk aversion, impatience, and positive and negative reciprocity— as well as a mea-
sure of general trust in other people, using the experimentally validated survey questions by
Falk et al. (2016). We control for these preferences because some of them may be correlated
with distributional preferences (e.g., negative reciprocity with inequality aversion or positive
reciprocity with altruism), while others may have an independent role in the demand for
redistribution. The results of Ga¨rtner et al. (2017) suggest, for example, that individuals’ risk
aversion may be relevant for their demand for redistribution.
Beliefs about the determinants of success. A considerable literature suggests that these
beliefs are important for individuals’ support for redistribution (e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Following Fong (2001), we asked respondents
the extent to which they believe that a) the willingness to take risks, b) inheritance, c) hard
work and initiative, d) luck, and e) having the right education are important reasons why
some people get ahead and succeed in life while others do not. For each item, individuals
had to indicate on a five-point scale whether they believe the respective factor is not at all
important (1) or extremely important (5). Note that the willingness to take risks as well
as hard work, initiative, and educational effort can be viewed as factors that are at least
partially under the individual’s control, while inheritance and luck are not. Based on this
consideration, we create two indices: one index measures the extent to which subjects believe
that factors under an individual’s control are important determinants of success (consisting
of answers to item a, c and e), and one index measures the extent to which they believe
that factors outside individuals’ control are important determinants of success (consisting of
answers to item b and d).
Position in the income scale. Several papers reported that people’s beliefs about their rel-
ative income may affect their demand for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al.,
2017). We therefore measured respondents’ beliefs about their relative income by asking
them to assess whether they think they earn a) more than the average, b) approximately the
average, or c) less than the average income of people of their own age. The answers to this
question also enable us to estimate the extent to which social preferences play a different role
for people who locate themselves in different relative positions of the income distribution.
Beliefs about past and expected future mobility. Beliefs about expected future income and
the future life situation may also play a role, as those individuals who expect improvements
may have a self-interested reason to oppose redistribution (Benabou and Ok, 2001). There-
fore, we used a proxy – taken from (Fong, 2001) – for perceived past improvements as well
as beliefs about future improvements by asking respondents to picture a ladder whose top
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step (step 10) represents the best possible life outcome and 0 represents the worst possible
life outcome for the respondent. Respondents were then asked on which step they feel they
currently stand, where they stood five years ago, and where they think they will stand in
5 years from now. It is well known that income within a society is substantially correlated
with subjective well-being, suggesting that the question above also provides a reasonable
proxy for future expected income.19 We construct a dummy for future upwards mobility,
which equals one if the individual believes he will be upwardly mobile in the next five years.
We also construct a dummy for perceived past upward mobility, which equals one if the
individual reports having been upwardly mobile in the past five years. Our results do not
change if, instead of dummies, we use continuous measures for expected future and past
upward mobility.
Of course, the degree to which individuals may support redistribution may also depend
on their perceptions of the prevalence of inequality and poverty. Therefore, we also elicited
individuals’ perception of the current level of inequality and poverty.
Perceived inequality. In order to assess respondents’ beliefs about inequality, we asked
them to indicate a) what they think is the share of the total income that the 10% of the
households with the highest income receive in Switzerland, and b) what they think is the
share of the total income that the 10% of the households with the lowest income receive in
Switzerland. We then define perceived inequality as “perceived income share of the top 10%”
divided by the “perceived income share of the bottom 10%.”
Perception of the prevalence of poverty. We measured respondents’ beliefs about the extent
of poverty in Switzerland by asking them to estimate how many people lived below the
poverty line in 2014. We then create a dummy that indicates whether a respondent’s belief
about poverty is above the median. Our results are also robust to using people’s “continuous”
estimates as a covariate.
Mistrust in politicians. We elicit mistrust in politicians by asking respondents how much
(on a four-point scale) they believe that Swiss politicians work to enrich themselves and
the lobbies they support instead of working for the benefit of the majority of the citizens.
This measure may be viewed as a proxy for people’s mistrust in political institutions (e.g.
19In fact, Fong (2006) – using the National Survey of Midlife Development in the U.S. – shows that her mea-
sure of expected future well-being correlates quite strongly with individuals’ expected future financial situation
(controlling for current financial situation). In addition, we validated the “income-proxy interpretation” of Fong’s
measure in a follow-up survey with the following question: “Compared to today, I expect my annual income in 5
years to have decreased a lot (-2), decreased a little bit (-1), stayed roughly the same (0), increased a little bit (+1),
increased a lot (+2). The Spearman rank correlation of this measure with Fong’s measure is 0.4, suggesting that
the latter captures changes in expected income reasonably well.
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the parliamentary institutions) including the government because politicians are the visible
“face” of these institutions.
General political attitude. Subjects were also asked to locate themselves on the left-right
political spectrum where one indicated “being far left” and ten indicated “being far right”.
Attention checks. In order to check for data quality, we added 2 attention checks to the
survey (one in the first half and one at the later part of the survey). Attention checks are
questions that measure whether participants read survey items carefully before answering
them (Berinsky et al., 2014). In our sample, data quality is remarkably high: 76% of the
subjects correctly answered both attention checks, and only 11% failed to pass both checks.20
The attention checks enable us to examine whether our results regarding the role of other-
regarding preferences for redistributive politics are robust to the exclusion of those who do
not pass the screeners
2.3 Data collection and sample
Implementation
The survey was conducted by the LINK Institute, a leading company for market research
in Switzerland, in March and April 2017. Because we are primarily interested in studying
the link between social preferences and political support for redistribution, we restricted our
attention to individuals who are eligible to vote, i.e. citizens who hold a Swiss passport and
are older than 18. While Switzerland has four official languages (French, German, Italian and
Romansh), we focus only on Swiss citizens from the French and German language area, who
make up more than 90% of the Swiss population. The LINK Institute reached out to par-
ticipants per email by sending them an invitation (in their corresponding languages) which
contained an URL to our online survey. All the instructions were displayed on participants’
screens. In order to mitigate spillovers between the money allocation task and the measures
of policy preferences, some policy preferences were elicited before the money allocation task,
while others were measured after it. In addition, we always had several other survey ques-
tions that were used as filler questions between these measures. For their participation in the
study, respondents were paid a show-up fee of CHF 15.21 In addition, we incentivized re-
spondents’ choices in the money allocation task by implementing one of their decisions. The
exchange rate between points in the money allocation task and Swiss Francs was 100 points
20The proportion of respondents who do not correctly answer attention checks can be extremely high in some
online samples. For example, Berinsky et al. (2014) show that between a third and a half of their sample fails to
properly answer their attention checks.
21At the time the survey took place, the exchange rate between Swiss Francs and USD was approximately equal
to CHF 1 = USD 1.
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= CHF 2.5. Median time to complete the survey was 62 minutes, for which respondents were
paid CHF 26 (incl. the show-up fee) on average, provided they completed the survey fully.
Sample characteristics
Our sample comprises data on 815 participants spanning 24 of the 26 cantons. Descriptive
statistics on participants’ socio-demographic characteristics can be found in Table A.2 in Ap-
pendix A.2. Overall, our sample is broadly representative of the Swiss voting population in
the German and the French language areas with respect to age, gender, geographical area,
income, and education (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.2).
Follow-up study
Two years after the main survey, we conducted a follow-up study (again with the LINK
institute) with the same respondents to collect three additional pieces of information. We
could survey 70% of the original subjects, which is remarkably high given that 2 years passed
between the two waves. Subjects were also not aware that we contacted them again. In
Appendix A.2, we show that the respondents of the follow-up are not significantly different
(in terms of their observable characteristics) from our original sample. Importantly, we also
show that attrition is orthogonal to social preferences (see Appendix A.4). We measured par-
ticipants’ beliefs about the primary goals and implications of the different popular initiatives.
As we mentioned above, the 1:12 initiative and the fair taxes initiative were predominantly
framed and publicly discussed in terms of “decreasing or constraining the income of the
rich”. In contrast, the minimum wage initiative and the initiative for an unconditional basis
income (UBI) were predominantly framed and discussed in terms of “helping those with low
incomes”, but the public discussion during the UBI campaign also brought the cost of the
initiative in terms of probable higher taxes into focus. Although we could have taken the
initiatives stated goals at face value, we wanted to measure how our respondents perceived
them.
In addition, we measured support for redistribution in the follow-up study using three
donation tasks with real monetary stakes that were presented to the subjects in a random
order. In each of these tasks, subjects received an endowment of CHF 20 and had to decide
how much of the CHF 20 to keep for themselves and how much to donate to civic groups
that differed in the type of redistributive policies they support/oppose (for further details,
see Appendix A.5). In one donation task, the civic groups are predominantly concerned
about helping those with low incomes. In another task, the civic groups primarily support
measures that ensure that richer citizens contribute more to tax revenues or that high salaries
are limited. In a third donation task, the civic groups support lower taxes for people with
high incomes, and oppose limits to salaries or bonuses for high earners. These donation tasks
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provide us with behavioral measures of support for redistribution that we use as additional
validation checks for our survey measures of political support for redistribution collected two
years earlier. In other words, we check whether those who voted for (opposed) redistributive
policies in the main survey are also more likely to donate real money two years later to civic
groups that politically favor (oppose) redistribution.
Third, we measure political support for a placebo initiative that is unrelated to redistri-
bution. This initiative intended to constrain the influence of political parties on the selection
of federal judges by proposing that they be selected using a random draw from a pool of
skilled applicants. Support for this initiative is elicited in the same way as support for the
four redistributive proposals from wave 1. Because this proposal is unrelated to issues of
income distribution, it helps us assess the specificity of social preferences, i.e., whether they
specifically capture concerns about distributional – but not other – issues. We refer to this
proposal as the placebo initiative below.
As in the main survey, we added a large set of unrelated filler questions between these
measures in order to minimize the desire for consistency and to limit spillovers across the dif-
ferent measures. Respondents received a baseline payment of CHF 15 for their participation
in the follow-up study. In addition, we incentivized respondents’ choices in three donation
tasks by randomly paying one of their decisions.
3 The distribution of other-regarding preferences
The main goal of this section is to identify the distribution of the various types of social
preferences on the basis of subjects’ behavior in the money allocation task. Previous evidence
(e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Bellemare et al., 2008; Fisman et al., 2015, 2017; Kerschbamer
and Mu¨ller, 2020; Bruhin et al., 2018; Cappelen et al., 2007) suggests that there is strong
heterogeneity in social preferences. Here, we are interested in a parsimonious characterization
of the distribution of preferences. We aim at identifying a small number of preference types
that differ in a fundamental way. Parsimony is important because tractability constraints in
applied contexts typically impose serious limits on the degree of complexity that theories can
afford at the individual level. In addition, parsimony has the advantage of simplicity and
ease of interpretability.
3.1 Identifying preference types and the distribution of individuals to types: the
method
To characterize preference heterogeneity along key dimensions, we adopt a Dirichlet Process
(DP) means clustering algorithm – a functional representation of the algorithm introduced
by Kulis and Jordan (2012). DP-means constitutes a Bayesian nonparametric approach to
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group observations into clusters according to similarities between them. In our application,
an observation is an individual’s budget allocation in all choice situations taken as an input
for clustering. The clusters we aim to identify in budget allocation space are social preference
types, while similarity refers to how “close” individuals are with respect to their allocation
behavior. An important peculiarity of the DP-means approach is that it enables identification
of preference types without committing to a pre-specified number of different preference
types in the population. Moreover, our approach does neither require ex-ante specification or
parameterization of types, nor of preferences and error structure. This means it remains ex-
ante agnostic about key distributional assumptions, and it does not constrain heterogeneity
to lie within a predetermined set of models or parameter space. In this regard, our approach
differs from previous work (e.g., Bellemare et al., 2008; Fisman et al., 2015, 2017; Bruhin et al.,
2018) that characterized preference heterogeneity on the basis of structural assumptions on
preferences and error terms.
The DP-means algorithm assigns a distribution to all possible type distributions that may
exist in the population. Intuitively, DP-means thus encompasses all possible type partitions
of the data spanning from a representative agent (i.e. a single data-generating process) up to
as many types as there are individuals in the population (i.e. n data-generating processes).
Put differently, both the actual number of types and their characterization are not assumed
ex-ante, but emerge endogenously with convergence to the algorithm.22
The clustering algorithm requires two inputs: First, the individual allocation profiles, and,
second, a penalization parameter λ. In our setting, a preference type is characterized by the
average allocation profile of all individuals belonging to this type (also called the centroid).
An individual’s allocation profile is the set of all budget choices that serve as an input for
clustering. Thus, an individual is conveniently represented as a single data point in an m-
dimensional space, where m refers to the number of budget choices under consideration, and
the location in each of the m dimensions represents the allocation choice on the respective
budget line.
We take all 14 budget choices in the center bundle as a primary input to determine
the types and the assignment of individuals to types. The preference characteristics of the
identified types and the distribution of individuals to types implies out-of-sample predictions
for each type in the north and the south bundles. For example, if there is a behavioral
type that predominantly chooses the central allocation in the center bundle, one may infer
that this type has preferences for equal payoff allocations. In the north bundle, however,
equal payoff allocations coincide with the own-payoff maximizing allocation for all negatively
sloped budget lines, while they coincide with the own-payoff minimizing allocation in the
22The fact that the number of types adapts to the data has important benefits (see Kulis and Jordan, 2012). Most
notably, as previous work has shown (see Comiter et al., 2016), this feature of the algorithm yields higher quality
type-separation than methods that specify the number of types prior to clustering (such as k-means).
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south bundle. Thus, subjects classified as those with a preference for equality (on the basis
of their choices in the center bundle) should choose the own-payoff maximizing allocation on
negatively sloped budget lines in the north bundle but the own-payoff minimizing allocation
in the south bundle. If they fail to do so, the interpretation of this behavioral type in terms
of a preference for equality would be questionable. The out-of-sample predictions for the
north and south bundle therefore help us validate the preference interpretation of the types
identified in the center bundle.
In addition to the allocation profiles, the DP-algorithm requires specification of a penal-
ization parameter λ, which can intuitively be interpreted as the cost of letting the model grow
by an additional type. In a nutshell, this approach works as follows (see Appendix B.1 for
a slightly more technical exposition): We define the algorithm recursively and initialize it
with a single social preference type – the representative agent with the population’s mean
allocation profile as its centroid. Each recursion step involves assigning each individual to
the type closest in allocation space, where closeness is defined by the squared distance to the
type’s centroid (i.e. the mean vector of its allocation profile). We then check whether the
squared distance between an individual’s allocation profile and the closest centroid is larger
than the penalization (cost) parameter λ. If this is the case, an additional preference type
is introduced to the model. Convergence of the algorithm is a fixed point of the series of
recursions. In words, at the limit of this series, an additional recursion stage has no effect on
the type assignment, and, thus, convergence is established.
The description above of the algorithm also makes clear that the number of types that
emerge depends, in principle, on the chosen penalization parameter λ. There are methods to
endogenize this parameter, but one convention is to choose the number of types for which
larger variations of the penalization parameter leaves the number of types unchanged. In
addition, we apply two further considerations for choosing the penalization parameter. First,
we examine what happens if we decrease λ and thus potentially increase the number of
types. In particular, we check whether fundamentally new types emerge or whether existing
preference types simply split into subgroups of an already existing type. If no fundamentally
new type emerges, there is little additional insight generated by a lower level of λ, and thus
little reason to reduce λ. Second, we examine whether the types that emerge for a given λ
yield qualitative predictions for the south and the north bundle that are consistent with the
types’ behavioral patterns in these bundles.
3.2 Identifying preference types and the distribution of individuals to types:
overall result
The application of the DP-algorithm to the center bundle of the money allocation task sug-
gests the existence of three fundamentally different behavioral types. We illustrate the ag-
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gregate behavior of each of the three types in Figure 3. Roughly half of the subjects (50.8%)
are assigned to Type 1, around one-third (34.36%) to Type 2, and the remainder (14.85%) to
Type 3. The three types differ substantially in terms of their behavior in the center bundle. A
careful examination of the decisions of these types permits us to assign them a label with a
clear behavioral interpretation.
For this purpose, we look at each individual’s median choice across the negatively sloped
and across the positively sloped budget lines of the center bundle. We focus on the median
because it is less susceptible to random, outlier generating, influences. For each budget line,
we label the own-payoff maximizing allocation by z = 1, the own-payoff-minimizing allocation
by z = 0, and the payoff-equalizing allocation by z = 0.5. The other four available allocations
on each budget line are equidistantly placed between 0-0.5 and 0.5-1, respectively. Figure 3
shows that the vast majority of individuals in type 1 makes median choices that are payoff-
equalizing – and they do so for both the negatively sloped budget lines (Figure 3a) and the
positively sloped budget lines (Figure 3b). They thus exhibit a willingness to pay (i) for
reducing inequality when this involves increasing the other player’s payoff (i.e., for negative
slopes) and (ii) when it involves decreasing the other player’s payoff (i.e., for positive slopes).
For this reason, we assign the label “inequality averse” to type 1 – which comprises 50.8% of
our sample.
This pattern contrasts sharply with the individuals assigned to type 2 and type 3. Individ-
uals assigned to type 3, in particular deviate sharply from the inequality averse type because
their median choice is the own-payoff maximizing allocation in the vast majority of the cases.
These 14.8% of individuals can therefore be classified as predominantly selfish. Finally, in-
dividuals assigned to the type 2 cluster differ sharply from the inequality averse type for
positively sloped budget lines where the own-payoff (and simultaneously other-payoff) maxi-
mizing allocation is basically their median choice in 100% of the cases. However, the behavior
of type 2 individuals for the negatively sloped budget lines resembles that of the inequality
averse individuals because the egalitarian allocation is their median choice in roughly 70% of
the cases. Thus, these individuals appear to care about equality when more equality can be
achieved by increasing the other player’s payoff, but they completely disregard equality when
more equality would imply a reduction in the other player’s payoff. We therefore label indi-
viduals belonging to this type, 34.4% of our population, as subjects with an altruistic concern
for social welfare – a label that will become even clearer when we look deeper into this type’s
behavior.
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Figure 3: Distribution of individuals’ median choices for each preference type.
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Note: In all figures, z = 0 (z=1) denotes the allocation that minimizes (maximizes) own payoff.
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Another remarkable aspect of Figure 3 is that there is generally very little within type vari-
ation, as indicated by the low standard deviation associated with each of the graphs shown
in the figure. This low within-type variation provides a further justification for speaking of
different types of preferences; and the fact that the typical choices of the three types sharply
differ justifies the notion that the preference differences across types are of a fundamental
nature.
3.3 A deeper look into the properties of different preference types
In this section, we provide a deeper analysis of the behaviors of the preference types by
examining their typical choice patterns for individual budget lines in the center bundle. As
we will see, this yields further useful information about the behavioral nature of each of the
three distinct types. In Figure 4 below, we depict the distribution of choices for each of the
various budget lines in the center bundle and order the budget lines according to the cost
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit (i.e., according to their slopes)23. The
figure shows the distribution of choices for each of the three types. For simplicity, we group
a type’s allocation choices for each budget line (slope) into three behavioral categories: The
first category is labeled “minimize own payoff ” and refers to the two allocations that yield the
lowest payoffs for the decision maker on that budget line (indicated by the color green in
Figure 4). For negatively sloped budget lines, “minimize own payoff” is also tantamount
to the maximization of the other player’s payoff. The second category is labeled by “central
allocation” and refers to the three allocations closest to the center of the budget line (indicated
by the color blue in Figure 4). The central allocations in Figure 4 are also those who are
closest to payoff-equality. The third category is labeled “maximize own payoff ” and refers to
the two allocations that yield the highest payoffs for the decision-maker on that budget line
(indicated by the color dark red in Figure 4).24 Note that this grouping of the choices into
three categories does not lead to much information loss because the subjects usually select
either one of the far ends of a budget line or they choose the strictly egalitarian allocation.
For example, subjects chose the strictly payoff-equalizing allocation for the “blue” choices in
84% of all cases.
23The cost of increasing the other’s payoff by one unit is given by –(1/slope). For example, it costs 20 cents to
increase the other’s payoff by CHF1 for a slope of -5.
24This labeling of choices in terms of minimizing/maximizing own payoff and central allocation choices makes
sense for all budget lines except for the vertical one (with slope −∞) which does not allow for any variation in
the decision-maker’s own payoff. The green color in this budget line indicates the choice of one of the two most
generous allocations while the red color labels the choice of one of the two least generous allocations.
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Figure 4: Behavioral types in the center bundle
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Type 1: Inequality averse - 50.8%
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Type 2: Social welfare concerns - 34.36%
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope
of the budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when
moving to the right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e.,
benefits) and the benefits of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when
moving to the right along the axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity)
the green colored part of a bar indicates the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of
the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates
the relative frequency with which subjects choose one of the two allocations with the highest payoffs
for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of one of the three central allocations. For
the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates the choice of one of the two most
generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels the choice of one of the
two least generous (and total payoff-minimizing) allocations.
Figure 4 confirms that the individuals belonging to the inequality averse type typically
prefer allocations that equalize payoffs between themselves and the other participant. In fact,
the degree of inequality aversion among these subjects is so strong that they predominantly
choose one of the central allocations even for those negatively sloped budget lines for which
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altruistic behavior is very cheap (slopes -inf, -5 and -2) and the other-payoff maximizing allo-
cation also maximizes the joint payoff. This type predominantly picks the payoff-equalizing
allocation even when increasing the other person’s payoff comes at no cost (slope -inf). More-
over, this type also shows a strong distaste for disadvantageous inequality. For instance, when
the slope of the budget line is +.5, she generally implements the equal allocation, implying
that she is willing to pay CHF 2 to reduce the other’s income by CHF 1 if this brings her
closer to equality.
In sharp contrast to the inequality averse type, the altruistic social welfare type is of-
ten willing to minimize her own payoff for negatively sloped budget lines (i.e., maximize
the other’s payoff) if that leads to the highest joint payoff, even if it implies that the other
player earns much more. For example, roughly 50% of these subjects choose the joint pay-
off maximizing allocation (green area) for the budget line with slope -5, and almost 90% of
them maximize joint payoffs for the vertical budget line (slope -inf). In addition, the social
welfare type chooses the joint payoff maximizing allocation in the vast majority (> 90%) of
cases for the positively sloped budget lines (red areas). Moreover, they do so even in those
cases in which this implies a considerable amount of disadvantageous inequality (slopes 2
and 5). Thus, these subjects display generally no aversion against disadvantageous inequal-
ity. Finally, however, the social welfare type predominantly chooses egalitarian allocations for
budget lines with slopes between -2 and -.5, i.e. they are willing to give up own payoff to
avoid advantageous inequality. Taken together, these regularities strongly suggest that this
type of subject cares for both joint payoffs and the payoff of the worse off player in case of
advantageous inequality. They are therefore consistent with social welfare types as described
in Charness and Rabin (2002) and with CES preferences (which capture concerns for joint
payoffs and equality in a general way but rule out aversion to disadvantageous inequality)
assumed in Fisman et al. (2015, 2017).
Finally, Type 3 predominantly maximizes her own payoff. For the large majority of budget
lines, from slope -5 to slope +1, these subjects prefer the own-payoff maximizing allocation
(dark red) in the vast majority (> 75%) of the cases. But some of them also show a touch of
envy or spitefulness as indicated by the roughly 25% of this type that chooses the “green”
allocations for slopes +2 and +5, implying that they minimize their own payoff to decrease
the other’s payoff. Thus, these subjects can be characterized as predominantly selfish with a
minority of them displaying envious choices in some cases.
If our preference interpretation of the behavioral types is correct and stable across budget
bundles, the different types should display characteristic behavioral patterns in the north and
the south bundles. In other words, the inequality averse type should also display a preference
for equality in these bundles even if that implies strong deviations from the allocations that
lie in the middle of the budget line. Likewise, the social welfare type should display a strong
tendency to choose joint payoff maximizing allocations. We illustrate this below for the south
25
bundle (see Figure 5) for each of the three types. We refer the reader to Appendix B.2 for the
north bundle.
In the south bundle, equality is maximized by the own-payoff minimizing allocation for
all budget lines with slopes ranging from -inf to +.5. This means the inequality averse type
should make primarily own-payoff minimizing (“green”) choices for these budgets, which
is exactly what we observe. Even for the budget line with slope +.5, where choosing the
payoff-equalizing allocation is quite costly, roughly 60% of these subjects do so. In contrast,
equality is maximized for budget lines with slope +2 and +5 by choosing the own-payoff
maximizing (“red”) allocation, which is what happens in the vast majority of the cases. Thus,
the behavioral pattern of type 1 players in the south bundle is very consistent with the notion
of inequality aversion.
Similar conclusions hold for the social welfare type and the predominantly selfish type.
Figure 5 shows that the latter type also makes own-payoff maximizing (“red”) choices in the
south bundle in the vast majority of cases. To see that the social welfare type also behaves
very consistently across the center and the south bundle, recall that the joint payoff as well
as the payoff of the other participant is maximized for budgets with slope -5 and -2 by the
own-payoff minimizing (“green”) allocations in the south bundle. Thus, the concern for joint
payoffs and the concern for the worse off in the domain of advantageous inequality should
induce the social welfare type to choose the own payoff-minimizing allocations, which indeed
happens in the vast majority (> 80%) of cases. Joint payoff maximization implies choosing the
own-payoff maximizing (“red”) allocations for all positively sloped budget lines, which again
happens in more than 80% of the cases. Taken together, the behavior of all three types in
the south bundle validates our preference interpretation of the three behavioral types derived
from subjects’ choices in the center bundle. We show that the same holds for the north bundle
in Appendix B.2.
What would happen if we chose a high enough penalization parameter λ in the DP
algorithm such that the number of types is restricted to two? In that case, the predominantly
selfish type vanishes and is merged with the other two types: roughly 60% of them are
submerged to the inequity averse type and 40% to the social welfare type. However, in view
of the fundamentally different behavioral patterns the predominantly selfish type displays
across all three budget bundles, a two-type distribution would clearly not do justice to the
actually existing fundamental heterogeneity of preferences in our population.
No fundamentally new types emerge if we lower the penalization parameter λ in the DP
algorithm. Rather, when λ is chosen low enough so that a four-type distribution emerges, the
social welfare type divides into two subtypes – a moderate and a strong social welfare type
that differ in their degree of other-regardingness: the strong type displays a higher willingness
to pay to increase the other player’s payoff when bestowing an altruistic benefit to the other
player is expensive (see Appendix B.4). If we further lower the penalization parameter so
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that 5 or 6 types emerge, the fifth and the sixth types comprise only a few individuals (1.4%
and 0.1% of the population, respectively), implying again that no fundamentally new types
emerge.
Figure 5: Behavior of types in the south bundle
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Type 1: Inequality averse
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
-Inf -5 -2 -1 -0.5 -0.2 0 0.2 0.5 1 2 5
slope
re
la
ti
ve
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Type 2: Social welfare concerns
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope
of the budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when
moving to the right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e.,
benefits) and the benefits of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when
moving to the right along the axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity)
the green colored part of a bar indicates the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of
the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates
the relative frequency with which subjects choose one of the two allocations with the highest payoffs
for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of one of the three central allocations. For
the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates the choice of one of the two most
generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels the choice of one of the
two least generous (and total payoff-minimizing) allocations.
27
Thus, taken together, the DP algorithm suggests the existence of three fundamentally
different social preference types: an inequity averse type, an altruistic social welfare type,
and a predominantly selfish type. Allowing for a higher number of types merely divides the
social welfare type into two subtypes (moderate and strong) or adds statistically negligible
types (that are hard to interpret). For this reason, and for the sake of parsimony, we mainly
use the three-type distribution for the analysis of the role of social preferences in redistributive
voting. However, we will also address the issue of within-type heterogeneity for the social
welfare type by showing how the voting behavior of the two sub-types of the social welfare
type relates to their social preferences.
4 The role of social preferences in political support for redistribu-
tion
4.1 Measuring political support for redistribution
For each of the 4 initiatives described in Section 2.2, respondents were asked to indicate the
extent to which they supported the initiative by answering either “Reject”, “Rather Reject”,
“Don’t Know”, “Rather Accept” or “Accept”. We define individual i’s support for initiative j
as follows:
Si,j = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ 1 if {Support, Rather support}0 if {Rather reject, Reject} (1)
We thus use a binary variable in our preferred specification that indicates whether a re-
spondent supports a particular initiative or not. Because we want to focus on individuals
who have well-defined preferences over these initiatives, we code “I don’t know” as missing.
Based on individuals’ responses to the four initiatives, we construct an individual-level aggre-
gate measure of political support for redistribution (ASi for aggregate support of individual
i) by averaging support for those initiatives for which the respondent reveals well-defined
preferences:
ASi = 1ni ni∑j=1 Si,j (2)
where ni ∈ [0, 4] corresponds to the number of initiatives which subject i has a well-
defined preference, i.e. for which she did not answer “I don’t know”. We depict the dis-
tribution of AS in Figure 6. The distribution is skewed to the left, with an average AS of
0.65 (standard deviation=0.31). This means that, on average, subjects support between 2 and
3 initiatives out of four. 33% of the subjects support all the initiatives for which they have
well-defined preferences, and slightly less than 25% of the subjects reject all the initiatives for
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which they have well-defined preferences.25 Intuitively, ASi captures the average probability
with which a subject supports or rather supports those redistributive proposals for which
he/she has a well-defined preference.
Figure 6: Distribution of aggregate political support for redistribution
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4.2 Validation of our measure of political support for redistribution
As in other countries, there are sizeable regional differences in support for redistribution in
Switzerland, e.g., across cantons. The percentage of people supporting redistribution is rather
low in some cantons, while it is relatively high in others. Thus, if our measure of political
support for redistribution contains relevant information about participants’ real preferences
for politically enforced redistribution, we should observe a correlation between the share
of individuals supporting redistribution in our sample and the actual vote share in favor
of redistribution observed using administrative data. In addition, individuals who support
redistribution in our online survey should also display a higher (lower) willingness to donate
money to civic groups that support (oppose) redistribution.
Correlation with real voting outcomes
The Spearman correlation between the canton-level share of individuals that support redis-
tribution in our sample and the cantonal share of support in the actual plebiscite is positive
(ρ = 0.36) if we average the shares over all four referenda. Note, however, that we modified
the content of two initiatives in order to make them less extreme and more appealing to our
respondents, which naturally weakens the behavioral connection between our online survey
and the actual votes. If we only average the shares over the two referenda that we did not
modify at all, the correlation becomes stronger (ρ = 0.54).
25Overall, subjects did not respond with ‘don’t know’ very often: approximately 70% of the individuals never
answered “I don’t know”, and about 20% of the individuals answered “I don’t know” only once, i.e. less than
10% of the respondents answered “I don’t know” at least twice.
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Predicting donations to groups favoring or opposing redistribution
We further validate our measure of aggregate political support for redistribution with several
donation tasks in a follow-up study. Recall that participants were endowed with CHF 20
in a given donation task. They could keep any of the CHF 20 for themselves or donate
it to civic organizations that support political redistribution (in two of the donation tasks)
or that oppose political redistribution (in one donation task). Because the follow-up study
took place two years after the initial study, a strong positive (negative) correlation between
subjects’ aggregate support for redistribution in our online survey and their donations to
civic organizations that support (oppose) redistribution would also indicate that political
preferences for redistribution are rather stable across time.
Table 1: Predicting donations to civic organizations with diverging views on redistributive
policies
Donation to groups
supporting redistribution (z)
Donation to groups
opposing redistribution (z)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregate Support (ASi) 0.863∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗ -0.345∗∗ -0.324∗∗
(0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.137) (0.140) (0.144)
Male -0.307∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.018
(0.079) (0.091) (0.086) (0.103)
Age 0.000 -0.015 -0.004 -0.019
(0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
Income: above-median 0.012 0.002
(0.104) (0.101)
Income: Undisclosed -0.048 0.024
(0.144) (0.177)
Constant -0.574∗∗∗ -0.637∗ -0.201 0.230∗∗ 0.315 0.597
(0.093) (0.342) (0.410) (0.104) (0.379) (0.453)
Other socio-demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes No No Yes
Occupation No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.076 0.149 0.159 0.012 0.028 0.033
Observations 571 571 571 571 571 571
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is subjects’ z-scored (mean = zero, standard deviation = 1) donation
to organizations that support (column 1-3) or oppose (column 4-6) redistribution. Other socio-demographics include
age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language is french, and a dummy indicat-
ing whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational
achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dum-
mies indicating whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the
labor force. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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In Table 1, we regress the z-scored donations to the different types of organizations on
respondents’ aggregate political support for redistribution. In columns 1-3 the dependent
variable is the z-scored average donation to civic organizations that support redistribution
via helping those with low incomes or via taxing the rich. In column 4-6 the dependent
variable is the z-scored donation to organizations that oppose redistribution. Columns 1 to 3
indicate that respondents who display a stronger political support for redistribution donate
significantly more to organizations that support redistribution (p < 0.01); an increase in AS
from zero to one increases donation to civic groups that support redistribution by more than
80% of a standard deviation. This large impact of AS on donations thus provides strong
evidence for the behavioral relevance of our measure of political support for redistribution.
Columns 4-6 in Table 1 also shows that individuals with a stronger aggregate support for
redistribution donate considerably less to organizations that oppose redistribution.26
4.3 Other-regarding preferences and political support for redistribution
In this section, we link subjects’ other-regarding preferences to their political support for
redistribution. We do so by regressing the aggregate support for redistribution of individual
i in canton c, ASic, on our social preference measures and the set of control variable described
in section 2. We start by estimating the baseline specification
ASic = β0 + β1SWi + β2IAi + Γ′Xi + φc + ε ic (3)
where SWi is a dummy that equals 1 if individual i is assigned to the social welfare
type and IAi is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual is assigned to the inequality averse
type. The omitted category in this regression are individuals who are assigned to the pre-
dominantly selfish type. We capture the role of social preferences with dummy variables
in view of the fundamental differences in preferences between the different types and be-
cause of the surprisingly low individual-level variation within types (see Figure 3 above).
In addition, we show that our results are robust to allowing for within-type heterogeneity
below (and in Appendix C.3). In equation (3), Xi is a vector of individual-specific controls
which includes age, age squared, gender, dummy variables indicating whether the respon-
dent is married, whether s/he speaks french, and a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
individual earns an income larger than the median income in our sample. In addition, we in-
clude a dummy variable indicating the roughly 10% of respondents who did not reveal their
income. We also include education dummies that indicate whether a respondent’s highest
educational achievement is a) compulsory school (omitted category), b) vocational training,
c) high school, d) university, or e) other. The regression also includes occupation dummies
26The smaller coefficient for ASi in regressions 4-6 (relative to regression 1-3) is due to the fact that donations to
civic groups that tend to oppose redistribution are generally rather small and heavily censored from below, while
donations to groups that support redistribution are mostly in the interior of the donations space.
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that indicate whether the individual currently a) has a full-time job (omitted category), b)
has a part-time job, c) is unemployed or d) is not in the labor force. Finally, φc denotes can-
ton fixed-effects and ε ic represents error terms. We report the results from this estimation in
column 1 of Table 2.27
The role of social preferences
In all the specifications, the two dummies for social preferences strongly predict aggregate
support for redistribution. Compared to respondents who are assigned to the predominantly
selfish type, those who display an altruistic social welfare concern are about 9 percentage
points more likely to support redistribution (p < 0.05). Similarly, inequality averse respon-
dents are about 11 percentage points more likely to support redistribution than predomi-
nantly selfish respondents (p < 0.01). While inequality averse individuals are slightly more
supportive of redistribution than those with a concern for social welfare, the two coefficients
are not significantly different from each other. These effects also survive the inclusion of a
host of controls that the previous literature has listed as potentially important factors in the
support for redistribution. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2 indicate that the size and significance of
the social preference variables remains basically unaffected by these controls.
The magnitude of the social preference effect is quite large; the effect size of inequality
aversion is, for example, 17% of the average level of support for redistribution in our sample.
This effect, and that for social welfare concerns, is even larger than the absolute effect of
income, although the difference between the social preference and the income effects is not
significant: On average, individuals who report an income above the median are about 7
percentage points less likely to support redistribution than individuals who earn the median
income or less (p < 0.05), which corresponds to a decrease of approximately 10.5% relative
to the average level of political support for redistribution that prevails in our sample.28 The
negative effect of income is consistent with the view that selfish motives are relevant for
the demand for redistribution – which makes sense because poorer individuals are likely to
benefit, while richer individuals will likely have to bear the costs of redistribution. However,
our results also suggest that other-regarding motives are at least as important.
27Throughout the paper, we report the results from the estimation of linear probability models. However, we
show in Appendix C.2 that our findings are robust to the application of multinomial logit regressions.
28If we use income as a continuous variable in the regressions, an increase of CHF 1000 in monthly income is
associated with a 1.3 percentage point reduction in support for redistribution.
32
Table 2: Social preferences and aggregate political support for redistribution
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.094∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Inequality averse 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Income: above-median -0.068∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Male -0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.012
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Have been unemployed in past 0.055∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.027 0.037
(0.027) (0.026)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.000 0.009
(0.024) (0.023)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.006
(0.013)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.032∗
(0.018)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.077∗∗∗
(0.022)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.016)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.016
(0.023)
Constant 0.321∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.409∗∗
(0.140) (0.142) (0.144) (0.186)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.085 0.096 0.097 0.132
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other socio-
demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language
is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether the re-
spondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest
educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occu-
pation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is
unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4 also control for subjects’ risk aversion,
patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in people (“other preference measures and general
trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 2 above includes all the subjects, including those who did not pass one or both
of the attention checks. We show in Appendix C.1 that if we rule our individuals who do
not pass one or both of the attention checks the influence of other-regarding preferences and
income becomes even larger. For example, if we consider only those subjects who pass both
attention checks (Table C.1), inequality aversion is associated with a 15 percentage points
higher support for redistribution (while in Table 2 it is 11 percentage points), and concerns
for social welfare are associated with a 12 percentage points (as opposed to 9 percentage
points in Table 2) higher support. To remain on the conservative side, however, we decided
to keep all subjects in our standard analyses.
The role of other economic preferences and general trust
Previous studies have suggested that risk aversion might play a role in individuals’ demand
for redistribution (e.g. Ga¨rtner et al., 2017). Since redistributive policies also function as
an insurance against negative income shocks, more risk averse individuals may be more
supportive of these policies. We therefore add individual-specific controls for risk aversion
in Columns 2 to 4 of Table 2. We also include measures of positive and negative reciprocity,
impatience, and general trust in people. The coefficients for these measures are omitted
from Table 2. Among all these measures, only general trust significantly predicts support for
redistribution. A one standard deviation increase in general trust in other people leads to an
increase in support for redistribution of about 3.5 percentage points (p < 0.01). The coefficients
of all the other measures – risk aversion, impatience, positive and negative reciprocity – are
close to zero and not significantly associated with support for redistribution.
Controlling for beliefs
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, we also add controls for perceived past and expected future
mobility, perceived inequality, mistrust in politicians/government, beliefs about the preva-
lence of poverty in Swiss society, as well as beliefs about whether individual success is due to
external factors or under people’s control. Interestingly, adding these covariates affects nei-
ther the association between other-regarding preferences and support for redistribution nor
that between income and demand for redistribution.
However, several of these variables are independent predictors of support for redistribu-
tion. In line with previous studies (e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2011), we find that respondents’ beliefs about the sources of individual success
significantly predict their support for redistribution. On average, people who more strongly
believe that factors beyond individuals’ control – such as inheritance and luck – are important
determinants of success are significantly more likely to support redistribution (p < 0.01), while
individuals who more strongly believe that factors under individuals’ control (willingness to
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take risks, hard work, and education) are important determinants of success are significantly
less likely to support redistribution (p < 0.01).
In our sample, individuals who more strongly believe that Swiss politicians work to
enrich themselves are more likely to support redistribution: a one point increase of mistrust in
politicians (on a four point scale) increases support for redistribution by 3.2 percentage points
– a quite substantial effect that is, however, only marginally significant (p = 0.076). In view
of previous results (Kuziemko et al., 2015), this finding might seem surprising, but it makes
sense in the Swiss institutional context because direct democracy constrains – and is also
widely perceived to do so – politicians’ space for non-transparent back-office deals. These
constraints may well be perceived as limiting “hidden costs” of redistribution and release
support in national plebiscites that force “corrupt politicians” to implement redistributive
proposals, if supported by a majority.
Other controls for respondents’ beliefs do not significantly predict aggregate support for
redistribution. For example, beliefs about future upward mobility do not predict aggregate
political support for redistribution. Furthermore, a respondent’s belief that she was upwardly
mobile in the past does not significantly predict her demand for redistribution. Finally, beliefs
about the extent of poverty and respondents’ perception of the degree of income inequality
in Switzerland are also not associated with support for redistribution.
The role of other socio-demographic factors
Several studies have investigated the role of socio-demographic factors in explaining support
for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Particular attention has been paid to gender,
race, religion, unemployment, and history of unemployment, amongst others. Like Giuliano
and Spilimbergo (2013), we also find that a history of unemployment (“past unemployment”)
is quite strongly associated with increased support for redistribution, but the significance of
this association vanishes if we control for beliefs about the sources of individual success and
trust in politicians. Occupational variables (such as part-time work or current unemployment)
as well as educational variables are not significantly associated with support for redistribution
except for respondents who are currently not in the labor force: they are between 8 and
9 percentage points more likely to support redistribution (p < 0.05). In our sample, these
individuals are largely retired (50% of the individuals indicating that they are not in the labor
force are aged 60 or more). The remaining socio-demographic variables such as age, gender,
or marriage status are all insignificant.
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Table 3: Social preferences and political support for a placebo initiative
Support for placebo initiative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.070 0.051 0.052 0.050
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Inequality averse 0.050 0.020 0.018 0.033
(0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
Income: above-median -0.051 -0.077 -0.078 -0.077
(0.059) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Male 0.018 0.026 0.024 0.002
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Age -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Have been unemployed in past 0.076 0.060 0.059 0.045
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.034 -0.020
(0.053) (0.053)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.043 0.054
(0.048) (0.048)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.035
(0.026)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.042
(0.031)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.017
(0.044)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.046
(0.028)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.020
(0.045)
Constant 0.519∗∗ 0.488∗ 0.502∗ 0.351
(0.257) (0.258) (0.261) (0.337)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.101 0.154 0.156 0.172
Observations 453 452 452 452
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the support for placebo initiative (0={Rather Against,
Against} 1={Rather In favor, In favor}). Other socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable
indicating whether the respondent’s native language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent
is married, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education
includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational
training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual
currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regres-
sions 2-4 also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Do other-regarding preferences predict support for the placebo initiative?
Ideally, the other-regarding preference types measured in our money allocation task are
specifically relevant for (re)distributive policies. They should, however, not be a general proxy
for political activism or other political concerns. Therefore, they should not predict support
for a proposal that is unrelated to redistribution.29 Table 3 provides compelling evidence
that, no matter the specification, this is indeed the case. Similarly, income, which played an
important role in predicting support for redistribution, does also not explain political support
for the placebo initiative.
What is the role of within-type heterogeneity?
Our method of clustering individuals into types has the advantage of parsimony and of
directing the attention to the key qualitative differences across preference types. We show in
section 3 and in Appendix B.4 that allowing further differentiation by decreasing the penalty
parameter λ in the DP-means algorithm does not yield additional insights into the existence
of basic preference types. Instead, this merely divides up the roughly 35% of individuals
belonging to the social welfare type into a moderate (≈ 14%) and a strong social welfare type (≈
21%), suggesting that there is some meaningful within-type variation in the strength of social
welfare preferences that might be relevant for the political support for redistribution. We
address this issue in two ways. First, we allow for four types that include the moderate and
the strong social welfare type when applying the regression models of Table 2. Second, we
explicitly measure individual behavioral variation within the social welfare and the inequality
averse type by measuring individuals’ deviations from the average type, and relate these
deviations to their support for redistribution.
We show how the existence of moderate and strong social welfare types affects the aggre-
gate support for redistribution in the regression table C.5 of Appendix C.3. The table repli-
cates Table 2 of the main text, but allows for four preference types. Table C.5 shows that indi-
viduals with strong social welfare preferences are roughly 11 percentage points more likely to
support redistribution, which is basically the same effect size as for inequality aversion, while
the moderate social welfare types increase their support for redistribution relative to the pre-
dominantly selfish types only by 5-6 percentage points – an effect that is not significantly
different from the political support of the predominantly selfish individuals. All other coeffi-
cients in the regressions remain basically unchanged when we allow for four types. Thus, the
overall conclusions derived from the three-type preference distribution remain valid, except
that a minority of moderate social welfare type individuals are not significantly different from
the predominantly selfish types in their support for redistribution.
29Note that the number of observations in Table 3 is smaller than in the main table (Table 2) because i) fewer
respondents took part to the follow-up survey, and ii) some respondents did not have a well-defined opinion
about this initiative (i.e. they answered “I don’t know”) and are thus “missing” from the regressions.
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To acquire further insights into the relevance of within type heterogeneity we also con-
structed an individual-level measure of behavioral deviations from a type’s typical behavior
in the money allocation task. For this purpose, we compute the deviation ∆i of each indi-
vidual’s median choice in the center bundle, denoted by zi, from the average over all zi’s
of the type (denoted by Z) to which the individual belongs. Recall that zi = 0 means that
the individual’s median choice minimizes the own payoff, while zi = 1 maximizes the own
payoff and zi = 0.5 equalizes payoffs. This deviation measure for the social welfare type is
thus ∆i,SW ≡ −(zi − ZSW), where the subscript SW denotes the type. We only compute this
measure for the negatively sloped budget lines for the SW-type because there is basically no
individual variation for the positively sloped budget lines (see Figure 3). On negatively slope
budget lines, ∆i,SW becomes positive if the individual deviates in the altruistic direction from
this type’s typical behavior and negative if the individual deviates in the selfish direction.
The distribution of individual zi‘s (together with ZSW) is shown in Figure 3.
We computed an analogous deviation measure from that type’s typical behavior for the
predominantly selfish type across all budget lines because selfish individuals’ median choice
zi equals 1 in most cases (see Figure 2). We computed analogous deviation measures for both
the negatively and the positively sloped budget lines for the inequality averse individuals.
These individual deviation measures enable us to control for individual-level heterogene-
ity by interacting them with the social preference dummies. Thus, the ‘pure’ dummies still
measure the main effect of type and the interactions tell us whether deviations from a type’s
typical behavior matter for the political support for redistribution. The regression results are
displayed in Table C.6 of Appendix C.3. They show that within-type variation matters nei-
ther for the selfish type nor for the inequality averse type because the interaction terms are
clearly insignificant. Individuals with a concern for social welfare who are more altruistic
tend to be more supportive of redistribution. An increase in ∆i,SW by one standard deviation
increases support for redistribution by 2 – 2.5 percentage points, but the significance of the
individual within-type variation vanishes if we control for the other determinants of redistri-
bution. However, the strong relationship between a type’s typical other-regarding preference
(captured by the ‘pure’ preference dummies) and their support for redistributions remains
unchanged and robust: the typical inequality averse individual is 11 percentage points and
the typical social welfare type is 9 percentage points more likely to support redistribution
than the typical selfish type.
Other-regarding preferences and political identity
In principle, other-regarding preferences may be a determinant of the degree to which people
feel affiliated with political parties. For example, people with a strong egalitarian preference
may feel a stronger affiliation with the Democratic Party in the US, as this party is typically
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more in favor of reducing inequality. In fact, Fisman et al. (2017) report that individuals who
put more weight on equality relative to efficiency were more likely to vote for Obama in 2012
and Dawes et al. (2012) report that individuals who are more generous in a single dictator
game tend to be more left leaning.
However, political affiliation or the degree to which individuals perceive themselves on a
left-right political scale may also be an independent factor in the support for redistribution.
For this reason, we collected individuals’ self-reported political “identity” on a scale from 1
to 10 and included this measure as a control variable in the regressions reported in Appendix
C.4. We were particularly interested in the question whether the substantial role of other-
regarding preferences remains robust to controlling for political identity.
Table C.7 shows the results of our basic specification with 3 different preference types
and Table C.8 displays the results with 4 types (i.e., with moderate and strong social welfare
types). In both sets of regressions, political identity plays a significant role: individuals who
are one unit more to the left on the left-right scale (1 standard deviation ≈ 2 units) are 6-7
percentage points more likely to support redistribution. Interestingly, however, inequality
aversion also remains a significant predictor of support for redistribution, with inequality
averse individuals being 9 percentage points more likely to support redistribution. The pic-
ture is somewhat more differentiated for the social welfare types. While the social welfare
dummy loses its significance in the specification with 3 preference types (Table C.7), individ-
uals with a strong concern for social welfare (i.e., allowing for four types) are still significantly
(8 percentage points) more likely to vote for redistribution (Table C.8). Thus, taken together,
other-regarding preferences in the form of inequality aversion and strong social welfare con-
cerns remain robust and significant predictors of support for redistribution even when we
control for political identity.
4.4 Is the role of other-regarding preferences income-dependent?
We have shown in the previous sections that other-regarding preferences are at least as im-
portant as income as predictors of aggregate political support for redistribution. Even after
controlling for a host of individual-level characteristics, individuals who are inequality averse
or show a concern for social welfare are substantially more likely to support redistribution
than predominantly selfish individuals.
While informative, these results might mask an important source of heterogeneity, i.
e., social preferences may empirically play a more important role for affluent individuals’
support for redistribution than for poorer people’s support. The reason for this heterogeneity
is the following. From a theoretical viewpoint, both selfish motives and social preferences
predict increased political support for redistribution for low-income individuals. Because
low-income individuals are the primary beneficiaries of (most) redistributive policies, it is in
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their economic self-interest to support these policies, leaving less room for social preferences
to play a role. In other words, the self-interest component may move low-income individuals
already so strongly towards support for redistribution that it may be difficult to identify an
additional role for other-regarding preferences.
On the other hand, social preferences and self-interest make opposing predictions for
high-income earners because they will most likely have to pay for redistribution. Therefore,
they have a selfish reason to oppose it. However, a high-income earner who is sufficiently
averse to inequality, for example, might endorse redistribution even if this is costly to her
because she values an increase in equality more than a loss in her own payoff. We examine
whether such heterogeneity in behavior is present in our data by estimating equation (3)
with the same (full set of) covariates as in column 4 of Table 2 but separately for individuals
earning an income below and above the median. We report the results in Table 4 below.
Column 1 displays the results for individuals with an income below the median. Interest-
ingly, and consistent with the above argument, the coefficients on the two dummies for social
preferences are much smaller than in Table 2 – indicating only an effect between three and
five percentage points. In addition, the social preference coefficients are clearly insignificant,
i.e., inequality aversion and a concern for social welfare play no major role in the support for
redistribution among these individuals.
This contrasts sharply with the results for individuals with an income above the median
that is reported in column 2 of Table 4. Their social preference coefficients are considerably
larger than in Table 2 and significantly different from zero: affluent inequality averse indi-
viduals are roughly 20 percentage points more likely to support redistribution (p < 0.01) and
those with a concern for social welfare are 12.6 percentage points more likely (p = 0.047) to
support redistribution than predominantly selfish individuals.
We further corroborate these results in columns 3-5 by estimating the same model but
splitting the sample into three different subsamples on the basis of individuals’ beliefs about
their relative income position. Individuals were assigned to these categories based on their
answer to the question “How does your wage compare to the wage earned by people of your
age?” with the answer categories: I earn less than the average, I earn approximately the
same, and I earn more than the average. Column 3 shows the regression results for people
who believe they earn less than the average, column 4 shows the results for those who believe
they earn the same as the average, and column 5 for people who believe they earn more than
the average.
The results are similar to those in columns 1-2. Social preferences are only weakly and
insignificantly associated with support for redistribution for respondents who think they earn
less than the average (column 3), but the association becomes large and significant for those
who believe they earn the average (column 4) or more than the average (column 5). In fact,
among individuals who believe they earn more than the average, inequality averse individuals
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are 29 percentage points more likely to support redistribution than predominantly selfish
individuals (p < 0.01), and those with a concern for social welfare are 20 percentage points
more likely to support redistribution than predominantly selfish respondents (p = 0.041).
Table 4: Social preferences and political support for redistribution (heterogeneity analysis by
income level)
Income Relative income
Below Above Less Same More
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social welfare concerns 0.053 0.126∗∗ 0.037 0.130∗∗ 0.200∗∗
(0.054) (0.063) (0.076) (0.056) (0.097)
Inequality averse 0.027 0.199∗∗∗ 0.037 0.144∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.059) (0.074) (0.050) (0.097)
Have been unemployed in past 0.025 0.013 0.001 0.043 0.045
(0.036) (0.043) (0.048) (0.036) (0.077)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.007 0.033 0.038 0.065∗ -0.050
(0.037) (0.042) (0.049) (0.036) (0.081)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.036 0.003 0.040 0.002 0.012
(0.034) (0.039) (0.052) (0.032) (0.068)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) -0.004 0.011 0.014 -0.007 0.072
(0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.049)
Misrust in politicians (1-4) 0.047∗ 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.100∗
(0.025) (0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.053)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.082∗∗∗ -0.076∗ -0.035 -0.091∗∗∗ -0.050
(0.027) (0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.068)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.030 0.108∗∗∗ 0.009 0.061
(0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023) (0.047)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH -0.007 0.007 0.017 0.027 -0.029
(0.033) (0.039) (0.050) (0.031) (0.071)
Constant 0.626∗∗ 0.071 0.426 0.442∗ 0.568
(0.256) (0.344) (0.352) (0.250) (0.615)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.194 0.185 0.265 0.167 0.370
Observations 363 366 204 454 149
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Column 1 (2) show the
results for below-median (above-median) income earners. Individuals in column 3 (4,5) report that they believe they earn
less (the same, more) than the average income of individuals of a similar age. Other socio-demographics include gender,
age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language is french, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational achievement
(compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating
whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. Other
preference measures and general trust include controls for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity
and general trust in people. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Finally, note that the belief that individual success is due to external sources plays no role
for above-median or above-average income earners, but appears to be an important determi-
nant of support for redistribution for those below the median or the average.
4.5 Does the nature of other-regarding preferences matter?
Our previous results show that both inequality aversion and an altruistic concern for social
welfare are substantially associated with the aggregate support for redistribution. Aggre-
gating across various redistributive proposals has the advantage of smoothing the inevitable
randomness in respondents’ answers, but it has the disadvantage of hiding that the two types
of other-regarding preferences may play a heterogeneous role across the different policy pro-
posals. In fact, inequality aversion and a concern for social welfare differ fundamentally from
each other with regard to the willingness to incur cost to reduce the income of the rich for
the sake of achieving equality.
Two of “our” national plebiscites have a strong egalitarian flavor – the 1:20 and the fair
taxes initiatives. Their initiators framed both of these initiatives in terms of rectifying the
unjust distribution of income and the unfairly low taxes that rich people pay in a fair number
of Swiss cantons. We also asked the participants of our follow up study how they perceived
these initiatives in terms of redistributive consequences. With regard to the 1:20 plebiscite, we
asked whether the initiative will primarily “increase the income of those who earn little” or
“decrease the income of those earning a lot” on a five-point scale. With regard to the fair taxes
plebiscite, we asked whether participants believe that this initiative will primarily “reduce the
taxes of those with low incomes” or “increase the taxes of those with high incomes”. Figure
7 shows that the vast majority of the people perceived these initiatives as decreasing the
incomes of the rich and only a tiny minority perceived them as increasing the incomes of those
who earn little. These initiatives might therefore be particularly appealing to individuals who
are generally inequality averse, while people with a concern for social welfare may find them
less appealing.
Are the above conjectures regarding the differential role of inequality aversion and con-
cerns for social welfare borne out by the data? Table 5 shows how these preferences are
associated with political support for the 1:20 and the fair taxes initiative. In addition to show-
ing the results for the two individual initiatives (columns 2-3 in Table 5), we also constructed
an index of aggregate support for these two “reduce incomes of the rich” initiatives in column
1 of Table 5. The table shows that inequality aversion is always associated with a substantial
increase in the political support for redistribution, while concerns for social welfare play a
much smaller role.30 On average, inequality averse individuals are 15.4 percentage points
30This conclusion is robust to differentiating between individuals with a strong and a moderate concern for
social welfare. Even those with a strong concern for social welfare do not exhibit significantly increased support
for the 1:20 and the fair taxes initiative compared to the predominantly selfish individuals (see Table C.9 in
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(p < 0.01) more likely to support the “reduce incomes of the rich” initiatives. In contrast, indi-
viduals with a concern for social welfare are only 8.6 percentage points more likely to support
these proposals (p = 0.064). This difference in the role of inequality aversion and concerns
for social welfare is significant (p = 0.034). Another interesting finding in Table 5 is that the
role of income is quite large for the “reduce incomes of the rich” initiatives: above-median
income earners are 11 percentage points more likely to oppose these proposals. However, the
coefficient for inequality aversion is still considerably higher than the income coefficient; in
fact, the coefficient for inequality aversion for the fair taxes initiative is more than twice as
large as the above-median income coefficient.
Figure 7: Perceived distributive consequences of the different initiatives
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(d) Min Wage
Which role do the two different social preference types play in the other two plebiscites?
If we just focus on the primary goal of the unconditional basic income (UBI) initiative and the
minimum wage initiative, theoretical considerations do not predict differences because both
initiatives are about supporting worse off individuals – a behavior that both types have shown
Appendix C.5).
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in the money-allocation task. Thus, a priori both social preference types appear equally rele-
vant. However, the public discussion with regard to the UBI initiative also concentrated a lot
on the financing of the proposal through higher taxes which – in the presence of a progres-
sive income tax system like in Switzerland – means disproportionately higher tax payments
for the richer individuals. We asked the participants in the follow-up study about whether
the UBI initiative will primarily “help those with low incomes” or will primarily lead to a
“higher tax burden for the rich” (on a five-point scale) and a considerable share of the people
thought that it will primarily lead to higher taxes for the rich (see Figure 7). This perception
might make the UBI differentially more attractive for inequality averse individuals and less
attractive for affluent individuals. The data in Table 5 (column 6) appear consistent with this
perception because inequality averse individuals are significantly more likely to support the
UBI initiative relative to the predominantly selfish individuals, while the coefficient for those
with a concern for social welfare is not statistically significant although it is still fairly high.
In addition, those with an above-median income show a strong opposition to the UBI, being
11 percentage points less likely to support it.
The perceptions are quite different for the minimum wage initiative, where our partici-
pants clearly share the view that it primarily increases the incomes of those who earn little.
This makes sense because the question who finally pays for the wage increase (consumers or
firms) is complicated and remains opaque for most voters. For this initiative, the coefficient
for inequality aversion is basically zero while the “concern for social welfare” coefficient is
again fairly high, although it again fails to reach the 5 percent significance level. However,
if we focus on those with a strong concern for social welfare, i.e., on those among the social
welfare types who put a relatively larger weight on equality compared to “efficiency”, we find
a significant association. We report these results in appendix C.8. Finally, it is interesting that
the coefficient for above-median income is also close to zero for the minimum wage initiative,
which is consistent with the idea that affluent people do not perceive higher minimum wages
as costly for themselves.
Taken together, these results suggest that inequality aversion appears to play a prominent
role whenever income reductions for the rich – whether they come in the form of higher
taxes or as direct constraints on rich people’s earnings capacity like in the 1:20 initiative
– are involved, while altruistic concerns for social welfare seem to play a smaller role in
these initiatives. In contrast, and somewhat surprisingly, inequality aversion plays no role
in the minimum wage initiative where income reductions for the rich are no theme and the
perceived consequence is “merely” an income increase for those who earn little. This contrasts
with the role played by strong social welfare concerns, which are significantly associated with
increased political support for initiatives that “help the worse off”.
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Table 5: The role of social preferences in initiatives that “reduce the income of the rich” (“1:20
initiative” and “Fair taxes initiative”) and in initiatives that “help the worse off” (“Minimum
wage initiative” and “UBI initiative”)
Reduce
income
of the rich 1:20
Fair
Taxes
Help the
worse off
Minimum
Wage UBI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Social welfare concerns 0.088∗ 0.086 0.061 0.085∗ 0.092 0.078
(0.047) (0.054) (0.058) (0.046) (0.056) (0.057)
Inequality averse 0.154∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.064 0.025 0.107∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.054) (0.044) (0.055) (0.055)
Have been unemployed in past 0.034 0.064∗ 0.011 0.041 0.020 0.057
(0.031) (0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.045)
Income: above-median -0.110∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.079∗ -0.044 -0.005 -0.110∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.063∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.027 0.013 0.038
(0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.030 0.021 0.044 -0.013 -0.035 0.011
(0.028) (0.033) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.009 0.016 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.018
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.017 0.015 0.022 0.039∗ 0.022 0.060∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.063∗∗ -0.039 -0.073∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.029 0.101∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.029 0.071∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH -0.011 -0.022 0.022 0.028 0.052 0.020
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039)
Constant 0.373∗ 0.744∗∗∗ -0.150 0.431∗ 0.676∗∗ 0.138
(0.226) (0.250) (0.290) (0.225) (0.271) (0.286)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.131 0.100 0.156 0.114 0.088 0.131
Observations 793 759 683 798 769 721
Notes: OLS regression. In columns 1 (4), the dependent variable is the aggregate support, i.e. the aver-
age, for two initiatives aimed at reducing the income of the rich (helping the worse off). In all the other
columns, the dependent variable equals 1 if the individual supports or “rather supports” the initiative
and equals 0 if the individual is against or “rather against” the initiative. Other socio-demographics in-
clude gender, age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language
is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether the
respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s
highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or
other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has a full-time
job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. Other preference measures and general
trust include controls for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general
trust in people. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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5 Summary and conclusions
Rising inequality in advanced capitalist countries has again put the issue of redistribution on
the political agenda. In this paper, we examined the role of other-regarding preferences for
individuals’ support for redistribution – a question that has so far received relatively scarce
attention in the political economy literature. To answer this question, we took advantage of
Swiss direct democracy where 4 radically redistributive proposals were put to vote in national
plebiscites during the last 10 years. This enabled us to measure people’s support for policy
proposals that were actually put to vote instead of using more general hypothetical questions
related to demand for redistribution.
Previous research suggests that other-regarding preference may have multiple facets –
i.e., individuals may not simply differ in their degree of “other-regardingness”, but that there
may be qualitatively distinct, and in some sense fundamentally incompatible, types of other-
regarding preferences. In our context, this incompatibility concerns, for example, the extent
to which other-regarding individuals are willing to sacrifice their own payoff for the sake of
achieving equality by reducing richer people’s income. Therefore, the first task is to identify
which fundamentally distinct social preference types exist in the broader population and to
assess their quantitative importance.
For this purpose, we designed an experiment that enables us to identify the existence
of distinct social preference types and their quantitative importance in a broad sample of
the Swiss population. Applying a novel Bayesian non-parametric clustering method to the
data of this experiment, we uncover three fundamentally distinct social preference types with
a clear behavioral interpretation: inequality averse individuals (comprising ≈ 50% of our
population), individuals with altruistic concerns about social welfare and those worse off
(≈ 35%) and predominantly selfish individuals (≈15%). Interestingly, the individual-level
behavioral variation within types is generally relatively low but within the social welfare type
there are two meaningful subgroups – a strong type that puts more weight on helping those
who are worse off, and a moderate type that puts more weight on joint payoffs.
We link individuals’ type of social preference with their political support for redistribu-
tion and show that both types of other-regarding preference are associated with a signifi-
cantly higher support for redistribution compared to the predominantly selfish type. This
association is robust to controlling for additional covariates which includes a large battery of
socio-demographic variables and other important determinants of demand for redistribution
that were previously discussed in the literature. Even after controlling for individuals’ po-
litical identity, other-regarding preferences remain strongly associated with political support
for redistribution. In addition, we also show that social preferences are particularly strong
predictors of support for redistribution among individuals with an income above the me-
dian. Inequality averse above-median income earners are 20 percentage points more likely
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to support redistribution than predominantly selfish individuals. Similarly, above-median
income earners with a social welfare concern are 13 percentage points more likely to support
redistribution compared to predominantly selfish individuals. In contrast, for below-median
income earners the discernible effect of social preferences is strongly diluted. Finally, the
identification of two quantitatively important social preference types enables us to examine
their potentially differential role for different types of redistributive policies. It turns out that
inequality averse individuals are substantially more likely to support policies that “reduce the
income of the rich” than those with an altruistic concern for social welfare, while the latter
appear to be (slightly) more supportive of policies that “help the worse off”.
Altogether, these results suggest that one can gain interesting new insights into the po-
litical economy of support for redistribution by taking other-regarding preferences – and the
variety thereof – into account. We therefore believe that the future research in this domain
would benefit from routinely measuring other-regarding preferences like inequality aversion
and concerns for social welfare. To make this possible, we provide a simplified version of our
experimental tool which allows the identification of the different social preference types with
only 5 different budget lines. We hope that this simplified tool will facilitate the application
of the methods used in this paper to examine the distribution of other-regarding preferences
in many more contexts including other cultures, countries and other types of redistributive
policies.
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A Background information on experimental tasks, survey measures
and population sample
A.1 Choice situations
The following Table A.1 shows the choice situations in the money allocation task that were
used to identify subjects’ other-regarding preferences. We used the 14 choice situations in the
center bundle to identify the different types of other-regarding preferences and the distribu-
tion of individuals across types while the 14 choices in the north bundle and the 14 choices in
the south bundle were used to validate the behavioral interpretation of the type distribution
identified in the center bundle.
The meaning of the list of variables in Table A.1 is as follows:
• ‘choiceId‘: the unique identifier for each choice situation.
• (own1, other1): represents the payoff combination at the lower end of the budget line (in
points).
• (own2, other2): represents the payoff combination at the upper end of the budget line
(in points).
• ‘bundle‘: indicates to which bundle the respective choice situation belongs to.
• ‘slope‘: the slope of the budget line in the “own payoff – other payoff” space.
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Table A.1: Choice situations in the money allocation task
choiceId own1 own2 other1 other2 bundle slope
1 450 750 750 450 center -1.0
2 750 1050 1050 750 center -1.0
3 450 1050 750 750 center 0.0
4 500 1000 800 700 center -0.2
5 550 950 850 650 center -0.5
6 600 900 900 600 center -1.0
7 650 850 950 550 center -2.0
8 700 800 1000 500 center -5.0
9 750 750 1050 450 center -Inf
10 700 800 500 1000 center 5.0
11 650 850 550 950 center 2.0
12 600 900 600 900 center 1.0
13 550 950 650 850 center 0.5
14 500 1000 700 800 center 0.2
15 300 600 900 600 north -1.0
16 600 900 1200 900 north -1.0
17 300 900 900 900 north 0.0
18 350 850 950 850 north -0.2
19 400 800 1000 800 north -0.5
20 450 750 1050 750 north -1.0
21 500 700 1100 700 north -2.0
22 550 650 1150 650 north -5.0
23 600 600 1200 600 north -Inf
24 550 650 650 1150 north 5.0
25 500 700 700 1100 north 2.0
26 450 750 750 1050 north 1.0
27 400 800 800 1000 north 0.5
28 350 850 850 950 north 0.2
29 600 900 600 300 south -1.0
30 900 1200 900 600 south -1.0
31 600 1200 600 600 south 0.0
32 650 1150 650 550 south -0.2
33 700 1100 700 500 south -0.5
34 750 1050 750 450 south -1.0
35 800 1000 800 400 south -2.0
36 850 950 850 350 south -5.0
37 900 900 900 300 south -Inf
38 850 950 350 850 south 5.0
39 800 1000 400 800 south 2.0
40 750 1050 450 750 south 1.0
41 700 1100 500 700 south 0.5
42 650 1150 550 650 south 0.2
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A.2 Demographic characteristics of sample population
In Table A.2 below we describe the main socio-demographic characteristics of the population
in our main study and the follow-up study. In Table A.3, we compare our sample popula-
tion from the main study with the overall population of Swiss voters for key demographic
characteristics.
Table A.2: Socio-demographic characteristics of sample population
Main study Follow-up
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Male 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.50
18-25 y.o. 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29
26-35 y.o. 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32
36-45 y.o. 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
46-55 y.o. 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
56-65 y.o. 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.39> 65 y.o. 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34
Have been unemployed in past 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Married 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Occupation: Full-time job 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
Occupation: Part-time job 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44
Occupation: Currently unemployed 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Occupation: Not in labor force 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Education: Obligatory school (up to 14 y.o.) 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Education: Vocational training 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49
Education: High school 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
Education: University 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Education: Other 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30
Income bracket: ≤ CHF 4000 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43
Income bracket: CHF 4001-6000 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41
Income bracket: CHF 6001-8000 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Income bracket: CHF 8001-10000 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Income bracket: CHF 10001-15000 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Income bracket: > CHF 15000 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Income bracket: NA 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29
French speaking 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40
Observations 815 573
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Table A.3: Comparison of sample population with the population of Swiss voters
Sample Population
Age 46.48 51.08
Male 0.55 0.48
Education : Obligatory school 0.04 0.11
Education : Vocational training 0.37 0.42
Education : High school 0.13 0.10
Education : University 0.34 0.35
Education : Other 0.10 -
Income bracket : ≤ CHF 4000 0.25 0.28
Income bracket : CHF 4001-6000 0.20 0.26
Income bracket : CHF 6001-8000 0.20 0.22
Income bracket : CHF 8001-10000 0.14 0.12
Income bracket : CHF 10001-15000 0.09 0.09
Income bracket : ≥ CHF 15000 0.02 0.03
Income bracket : NA 0.10 -
Unemployed 0.03 0.03
Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics (mean) for the main socio-demographics
of the main sample and for the Swiss population. The population data were obtained
from the Swiss Federal Bureau of Statistics (2018) and are restricted to the adult Swiss
population (i.e. individuals holding a swiss passport who are at least 18 years old).
A.3 Details on the measurement of political support for redistribution and other
covariates
Political support for redistribution
The concrete wording of the 1:20 initiative in our online survey is given in the main text.
Below, we provide the concrete wording for the other three redistributive proposals.
Fair taxes initiative Suppose that a vote takes place next weekend. The goal of this vote is
to subject higher incomes to a minimum level of taxation. In particular, the law provides the
following two points :
• Municipalities and cantons are required to tax any income exceeding CHF 250,000 per
year at a minimum rate of 22%. This means that, above the threshold of CHF 250’000,
each additionally earned franc is taxed at a rate of at least 22%. For example, if a person
has an income of CHF 300,000, then that person is taxed on the first CHF 250,000 at a
rate that can be freely set by the cantons and the municipalities, but the remaining CHF
50,000 must taxed at a rate of at least 22%.
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• Municipalities and cantons are obliged to tax any wealth exceeding CHF 2’000’000 at
a rate of at least 0.5%. This means that, above the threshold of CHF 2 million, every
additional Swiss franc of wealth is taxed at a rate of at least 0.5% (i.e. at 0.5 centimes per
franc). For example, if a person owns a fortune of CHF 4 million, the first CHF 2 million
will be taxed at a rate that can be freely set by the cantons and the municipalities, but
must be taxed at a rate of at least 0.5% on the remaining CHF 2 millions
Would you support or reject this initiative? [Answer categories: Support, Rather support,
Don’t Know, Rather reject, Reject]
Minimum wage initiative In May 2014, Switzerland voted on the introduction of a legal
minimum wage of CHF 22 per hour, i.e. approximately CHF 4,000 per month (before taxes).
The initiative wanted to constrain the companies to pay each worker at least CHF 22 per
hour worked. Suppose that next weekend another plebiscite takes place, but that this time
the initiative is about a legal minimum wage of CHF 16.50 per hour, i.e. around CHF 3,000
per month (before taxes). Would you support or reject this initiative? [Answer categories:
Support, Rather support, Don’t Know, Rather reject, Reject]
Unconditional basic income (UBI) initiative Suppose that a vote on the introduction of an
unconditional basic income takes place next weekend. If this initiative is accepted, the federal
government automatically pays the basic income to every citizen in Switzerland. Would you
support or reject this initiative? [Answer categories: Support, Rather support, Don’t Know,
Rather reject, Reject]
Socio-demographics, other preference measures and trust
In addition, we collected information on age, gender, marital status, the highest achieved
level of education (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university, other),
occupational status (full time job, part-time job, currently unemployed, not in the labor force),
whether the individual has experienced unemployment in the past, municipality of residence
and income. In addition, we measured risk preferences, patience, negative reciprocity
and positive reciprocity as well as subjects general trust in people with the experimentally
validated survey questions of Falk et al. (2016).
We also elicited individuals’ beliefs that are potentially relevant for their voting behavior
such as their beliefs about the chances to improve one’s life over the next few years (‘mobil-
ity’), perceived inequality, trust in politicians and the sources of individuals’ success in life.
We describe the details of these measures below.
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Role of internal (controllable) sources of individual success
Individuals are asked the following questions (taken from Fong 2001 and Gallup): “Below
are several reasons why some people get ahead and succeed in life and others do not. Using
a 1-5 scale, where 1 means not at all important and 5 means extremely important, please tell
us how important each of the following items is as a reason for a person’s success. You can
choose any number from one to five. How important is:
• Willingness to take risks (risk)
• Hard work and initiative (hardwork)
• Have the right education and training (education)
We then create an index denoted as “Success under individual’s control” which is given by
(risk+hardwork+ education)/3.
Role of external (uncontrollable) sources of individual success
Individuals are asked the following questions (taken from Fong 2001 and Gallup): “Below
are several reasons why some people get ahead and succeed in life and others do not. Using
a 1-5 scale, where 1 means not at all important and 5 means extremely important, please tell
us how important ieach of the following items is as a reason for a person’s success. You can
choose any number from one to five. How important is:
• Inheritance (inheritance)
• Luck, being at the right time at the right place (luck)
We then create an index denoted as “Success determined by external factors” which is given
by (inheritance + luck)/2.
Mistrust in politicians
What do you think about the following statement? “Swiss politicians work to enrich them-
selves and the lobbies that they support instead of working for the benefit of the majority of
the citizens. [1. Disagree, 2. Rather disagree, 3. Rather agree, 4. Agree]
Mobility
Two mobility measures are constructed from the following three questions (based on Fong
2001 and Gallup):
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1. Think of a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the
best possible life for you, and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you. If
the top step is 10 and the bottom step is 0, on which step of the ladder do you feel you
personally stand at the present time? [current step]
2. On which step would you say you stood five years ago? [past step]
3. Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about
five years from now? [future step]
Based on the answers we create the following measures:
• Beliefs about future mobility = future step - current step. This variable ranges from -10
to +10.
• Perceived past mobility = current step – past step. This variable ranges from -10 to +10.
We then construct two dummies for [expected future/perceived past] mobility:
• ‘Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile’ = 1 if beliefs about future mobility > 0
• ‘Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile’ = 1 if perceived past mobility > 0.
Perceived inequality
Subjects are presented the following text: “For the next questions, we define income as the
total salary received by an individual for his work. We refer to gross income as the income
received by an individual prior to any tax, pension and social insurance deduction. The total
income of a country corresponds to the sum of incomes that all households in the country
receive. Consider the two most extreme examples:
• In a country with nearly the maximum level of income inequality, the 10% of the house-
holds with the highest earnings receive 100% of the total income. The remaining 90%
of the households receive 0% of the total income.
• In a country with nearly the minimum level of income inequality, the 10% of the house-
holds with the highest earnings receive 10% of the total income. The 10% of the house-
holds with the lowest earnings receive 10% of the total income
What do you think is the share of the total income that the 10% of households with the
highest income receives in Switzerland? [perceived top share] The 10% of households with
the highest income earn the following share of the total income: ...
What do you think is the share of the total income that the 10% of households with the
lowest income receives in Switzerland? [perceived bottom share] The 10% of households
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with the lowest income earn the following share of the total income: ...
We then construct the following index of perceived inequality (and we z-score it): Per-
ceived Inequality = (Perceived top share - Perceived bottom share)/100.
A.4 Attrition
The Table A.4 below shows that participation in wave 2 is orthogonal to social preferences,
and to most of the covariates.
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Table A.4: Attrition
Participated in follow up
(1) (2)
Social welfare concerns -0.025 0.002
(0.048) (0.052)
Inequality averse -0.047 -0.016
(0.046) (0.050)
Income: above-median -0.019
(0.041)
Male 0.045
(0.039)
Age 0.024∗∗∗
(0.008)
Age squared -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
French speaking -0.113
(0.175)
Have been unemployed in past 0.084∗∗
(0.037)
Married -0.018
(0.038)
Standardized values of (riskaversion) 0.014
(0.017)
Pos Rec 1 : return favor (z) -0.007
(0.017)
Pos Rec 2 : reciprocate help (z) 0.005
(0.017)
Neg Rec 1 : Revenge injustice (z) 0.013
(0.021)
Neg Rec 2 : reciprocate bad position (z) 0.009
(0.022)
Standardized values of (impatience) -0.006
(0.017)
Standardized values of (trustnaef) -0.003
(0.017)
Income: Undisclosed -0.061
(0.061)
Education: Vocational training -0.112
(0.087)
Education: High school 0.026
(0.092)
Education: University -0.136
(0.089)
Education: Other -0.208∗∗
(0.101)
Occupation: Part-time job 0.001
(0.045)
Occupation: Currently unemployed 0.034
(0.104)
Occupation: Not in labor force 0.070
(0.048)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.009
(0.039)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.050
(0.035)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.019
(0.018)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.010
(0.024)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) 0.037
(0.032)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.009
(0.023)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.009
(0.034)
Constant 0.736∗∗∗ -0.044
(0.040) (0.257)
Canton FE No Yes
R2 0.001 0.085
Observations 815 813
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable measures
participation in wave 2. It is a dummy which equals 1 if
the subject did participate in the follow-up study, and zero
otherwise. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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A.5 Description of the follow-up study
Two years after the main study, we contacted the same respondents again in order to col-
lect three additional pieces of information: a) their beliefs about the perceived distributional
consequences of the different initiatives, b) their willingness to donate real money to civic
organizations that either support or oppose redistribution, and c) their support for a placebo
initiative that is unrelated to redistribution. In this section, we describe how these different
measures were elicited.
Perceived distributional consequences of the different initiatives
We measured respondent’s beliefs about the primary goals and implications of the four
initiatives by asking respondents to indicate whether a particular initiative would primarily
affect those with low income, or those with high income. For each initiative, we described
the proposal in a similar way as in the main study. For example, we elicited respondents
beliefs about the perceived distributional consequences of the 1:20 initiative as follows:
“Suppose that a vote on an initiative aimed at limiting pay inequality within companies takes place
next weekend. This initiative demands that the highest salary paid by a company must not exceed
twenty times (20 times) the lowest salary paid by that same company. In your opinion, what will be
the primary effect of this initiative? Do you think this initiative will primarily increase the income
of the employees who earn only little, or do you think that it will primarily reduce the income of the
employees at the top of companies who earn a lot? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 1 to
5, where 1 means you think this initiative will “primarily increase the income of those who earn only
little” and 5 means you think this initiative will “primarily reduce the income of those earning very
much”.”
Beliefs about the perceived distributional consequences of the other initiatives were elicited
in a similar way.
Donation tasks
We measured support for and opposition to redistribution using three donation tasks with
real monetary stakes using the following questions.
“In recent years, international competition, globalization and technological progress have put the issue
of inequality in our societies at the center of the discussion. Some people feel that inequality has
increased too much while others do not see this as a big problem. There are, in principle, several ways
to reduce inequality in a country.
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• One way to reduce inequality is to improve the economic situation of those who have low incomes.
This can be achieved, for example, through raising wages (via a minimum wage initiative that
ensures that companies cannot pay wages below the minimum) or by giving those with low
incomes financial support (for example by offering them Child allowances, discounted health
insurance premiums, discounted kindergarten tariffs or subsidies to cover their housing costs).
• Another way to reduce inequality is by reducing the income or the wealth of the rich. This can
be achieved, for example, by ensuring that they pay more taxes or by putting a limit on the
maximum salary or bonus they can be paid.
Various political and social groups are currently supporting different measures intended to reduce
inequality in Switzerland. Some groups are primarily concerned with helping those with lower
incomes, while others primarily support measures that would ensure that the rich contribute more
to tax revenues or that very high salaries and bonuses are limited. Examples of such groups include
non-profit organizations (e.g. CARITAS), unions and political parties. In contrast, other political and
social groups want lower taxes for people with high incomes, and do not want to limit the salaries and
the bonuses of top managers.
In the following task, your will have to take three decisions. Each decision will involve splitting CHF
20 (that you receive from us) between yourself and a political or a civic group. In each of the three
decisions, the policies supported by the group will be different. At the end of the study, the computer
will randomly select one of your decisions and implement it. This means that one of these groups will
really receive your donation, and you will keep the remaining money. The money that you decide to
keep for yourself will be transferred directly to your bank account by LINK at the end of this survey.
The university of Zurich will transfer your donation to the civic group shortly after the end of the
survey.”
For each decision, we then told subjects that they received CHF 20 from us, and asked them
to decide how to spend these 20 francs. For example, we asked:
“For this decision we give you CHF 20. You can use this money to help a group or an organization
that supports political measures that increase the contribution of the rich to tax revenue. The money
that you do not give to such a civic group can be kept by yourself. How much of the CHF 20 do you
want to give to a group or an organization that supports political measures that improve the tax and
income situation of those with lower incomes? Please indicate how much you want to donate. You can
choose any number between 0 and 20.”
The two other decisions were asked in a similar way.
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Support for a placebo initiative
We elicited support for the placebo initiative using the exact same methodology as for the
four redistributive initiatives from the main study. Specifically, we asked:
“Suppose that next weekend a referendum on the designation of federal judges takes place. The
initiative wants to constrain the influence of political parties on the selection of federal judges by
proposing that they are elected via a random draw. A specialized commission makes sure that the
candidates that can be drawn as judges have the appropriate professional and personal skills to be
eligible to become a federal judge. The members of the specialized commission are elected by the Federal
Council and can serve for a maximum of 12 years. Would you accept this initiative, or would you
reject it?”
The answer categories are: Accept, Rather accept, I don’t know, Rather reject, Reject.
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B Material related to the identification of the type distribution of
other-regarding preferences
B.1 Details on the method for identifying the distribution of preference types
This appendix provides a slightly more technical description of the clustering algorithm used
to identify the preference types and their distribution in the population. We first briefly
compare the Dirichlet process (DP) means algorithm used in this paper to the widely used
k-means algorithm. We then outline our implementation.
The k-means algorithm (originally proposed by Lloyd (1957/1982) and Forgy (1965)) can
be derived as a limiting case of the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm for a Gaussian
mixture (see, e.g., Bruhin, Epper and Fehr-Duda (2010) and Burghart, Epper and Fehr (2017)
for applications of the EM algorithm). More specifically, when letting the posterior proba-
bilities of being assigned to one of k clusters (where the number of clusters is fixed ex-ante)
converge towards certainty or impossibility we obtain a hard clustering corresponding to k-
means clustering. The same can be done in a Bayesian setting: Starting with a Gibbs sampler
of the Dirichlet process (DP) mixture one obtains DP-means as an asymptotic result (see Kulis
and Jordan (2012)). There are several key differences between the k-means and the DP-means
algorithm. First, for k-means the statistician has to ex-ante define the number of clusters she
wants the observations to be assigned to. For DP-means, she has to set only a cluster penalty
parameter that we denote by λ and that penalizes the addition of new clusters.31 Once λ
is fixed, the number of clusters emerge endogenously. For example, by setting λ = 3.75 we
obtain three types, for λ = 4 there are two types, and λ = 3.5 leads to four types (see also
Appendix B.4).
Our implementation of the algorithm is based on an iterative refinement. We first span
an m-dimensional space, with m denoting the number of budget lines used for the clustering
algorithm, and then map individuals’ choices for the m budget lines into it. Consequently,
each individual’s choices are represented by a single point in the m-dimensional space. We
then ask how subjects populate this space. Specifically, we are interested in the number
of clusters (i.e. types) that emerge and individuals’ assignment to clusters. A cluster is
characterized by the set of the individuals assigned to the cluster and the associated mean
vector of observations (the “centroid”), which – in our case – represents the mean (cluster-
representative) behavior of the individuals in m-dimensional space that belong to the cluster.
We initialize the algorithm with a single centroid specified as the global mean vector. At
this stage, all data points are assigned to this single centroid. We then refine by iterating
over the following two steps: First, we sequentially go through the list of data points in
m-dimensional space (i.e. subjects), and check for each subject whether any of the squared
31There exist extensions of this DP-means algorithm that endogenize this step (see e.g. Comiter et al. (2016)).
This comes at much more complexity, however, and does not provide further insights for our application.
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Euclidean distances to the centroid exceeds the cluster penalty parameter λ. If this is the
case, we open up a new cluster with the actual data point’s location vector as the centroid.
Otherwise, we assign the data point to its nearest cluster. Second, we collect the subjects
assigned to the same clusters and update the centroids by computing the mean vector for
each cluster. These two steps are repeated until convergence is reached, i.e. until there is no
change in subjects’ assignments.32
As Kulis and Jordan (2012) demonstrate, this iterative procedure is equivalent to mini-
mizing the objective
min{gc}kc=1
k∑
c=1 ∑x∈gc∥x − µc∥2+λk ,
where x denotes the vector of observations, µ the vector of centroids, and g the cluster par-
titioning of x. It is straightforward to see that this objective is equivalent to the k-means
objective except for the additional penalty term λk.
32In principle, the clustering could depend on the ordering of observations in the data. To check whether this
poses an issue in our case, we shuffled the observations and re-ran the clustering for each permutation. Our
conclusions and, in particular, the types that emerge from our data and the individuals’ assignments are not
affected by this exercise.
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B.2 Validating the behavioral types with the north bundle
In Section 3.3 and Figure 5 we have shown that the preferences of the three fundamentally
distinct types of other-regarding preferences are well validated by individuals’ behavior in
the south bundle of budget lines. Here we extend this validation exercise to the north bundle
in which the decision-maker is always at least weakly better off than the other participant.
For budget lines with a negative slope (from -inf to -0.2), the egalitarian allocation coincides
in the north bundle with the own-payoff maximizing allocation. Thus, individuals that are
inequality averse should predominantly chose the own payoff maximizing allocation for these
budget lines which is indeed what we observe (see Figure B.1 below). Individuals belonging
to the predominantly selfish type should also chose the own-payoff maximizing allocation
for these budget lines, which is also borne out by the data show in Figure B.1 below. Finally,
individuals belonging to the social welfare type will deviate from the own-payoff maximizing
choice if the negative budget lines are very steep, i.e., if they can increase the total payoff by
sacrificing own money. And indeed, for the budget lines with slope -inf, -5 and -2, which
enable increases in total payoff by making altruistic choices, these individuals deviate very
frequently in the altruistic direction thus validating that they are concerned about the total
payoff. This concern for total payoffs is further supported by the fact that for those negative
budget lines for which altruistic behavior does not generate total payoff increases (slopes -1,
-0.5 and -0.1) these subjects predominantly chose the own-payoff maximizing allocation.
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Figure B.1: Behavior of types in the north bundle
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope of the
budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when moving to the
right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e., benefits) and the benefits
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when moving to the right along the
axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity) the green colored part of a bar indicates
the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for
the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates the relative frequency with which subjects choose one
of the two allocations with the highest payoffs for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of
one of the three central allocations. For the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates
the choice of one of the two most generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels
the choice of one of the two least generous (and equality-maximizing) allocations.
For budget lines with non-negative slopes (from 0 to +5) those concerned with social welfare
should always choose the own-payoff maximizing allocation regardless of the consequences
for the payoff distribution. Again, the vast majority of individuals assigned to the social wel-
fare type exactly behaves in this way. For the inequality averse individuals, the situation is
more complicated because for budget lines with slope +2 and +5 the own payoff-minimizing
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(“green”) allocation coincides with the allocation that comes closest to equality. Therefore,
these subjects should show deviations from own-payoff-maximizing behavior; in fact, the
vast majority chooses either the central or the own-payoff minimizing allocation for these
budget lines. In contrast, for the budget lines with a zero or moderate slope (0, +0.2, +0.5)
the own-payoff maximizing allocation coincides with the allocation that comes closest to pay-
off equality. Therefore, here the inequality averse subjects should choose the own-payoff
maximizing allocation which indeed is the case for the vast majority of inequality averse in-
dividuals. The predominantly selfish types should also choose the own-payoff maximizing
allocation for these budget lines and most of them indeed do so.
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B.3 Validating the behavioral types with the displaced north bundle and the dis-
placed south bundle
In the north bundle and the south bundle a large number of budget lines include allocations
that perfectly equalize the payoffs of both players. To rule out that the existence of these
perfectly payoff equalizing allocations affect our validation exercises we had also included
a so-called “displaced” north and a “displaced” south bundle in the money allocation task.
These budget lines are described in Table B.1 and in Figure B.2. They are displaced in the
sense that the fully payoff equalizing allocation is not feasible in most cases.
Figures B.3 and B.4 indicate that the feasibility of a perfectly payoff-equalizing allocation
does not matter much because the behavioral patterns of the 3 types in the displaced bundles
is very similar to the patterns observed in the non-displaced bundles, i.e. Figure B.3 looks
very much like Figure B.1 and Figure B.4 looks very much like Figure 5 in the main text.
Table B.1: Choice situations in the money allocation task in the displaced north bundle and
the displaced south bundle
choiceId own1 own2 other1 other2 bundle slope
43 250 850 950 950 northDisplaced 0.0
44 300 800 1000 900 northDisplaced -0.2
45 350 750 1050 850 northDisplaced -0.5
46 400 700 1100 800 northDisplaced -1.0
47 450 650 1150 750 northDisplaced -2.0
48 500 600 1200 700 northDisplaced -5.0
49 550 550 1250 650 northDisplaced -Inf
50 600 700 600 1100 northDisplaced 5.0
51 600 800 600 1000 northDisplaced 2.0
52 500 900 700 900 northDisplaced 0.5
53 400 900 800 900 northDisplaced 0.2
54 650 1250 550 550 southDisplaced 0.0
55 700 1200 600 500 southDisplaced -0.2
56 750 1150 650 450 southDisplaced -0.5
57 800 1100 700 400 southDisplaced -1.0
58 850 1050 750 350 southDisplaced -2.0
59 900 1000 800 300 southDisplaced -5.0
60 950 950 850 250 southDisplaced -Inf
61 600 1100 600 700 southDisplaced 0.2
62 600 1000 600 800 southDisplaced 0.5
63 700 900 500 900 southDisplaced 2.0
64 800 900 400 900 southDisplaced 5.0
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Figure B.2: Budgets lines in the displaced north bundle and the displaced south bundle
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(b) South Displaced Bundle
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Figure B.3: Behavior of types in the displaced north bundle
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope of the
budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when moving to the
right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e., benefits) and the benefits
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when moving to the right along the
axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity) the green colored part of a bar indicates
the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for
the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates the relative frequency with which subjects choose one
of the two allocations with the highest payoffs for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of
one of the three central allocations. For the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates
the choice of one of the two most generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels
the choice of one of the two least generous (and equality-maximizing) allocations.
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Figure B.4: Behavior of types in the displaced south bundle
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope of the
budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when moving to the
right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e., benefits) and the benefits
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when moving to the right along the
axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity) the green colored part of a bar indicates
the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for
the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates the relative frequency with which subjects choose one
of the two allocations with the highest payoffs for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of
one of the three central allocations. For the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates
the choice of one of the two most generous (and equality-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels
the choice of one of the two least generous (and total payoff-minimizing) allocations.
73
B.4 Allowing for four and more types
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the paper we show that there are three fundamentally different social
preference types and we validate our preference interpretation of the behavioral patterns by
demonstrating that the different types behave rather consistently across different budget line
bundles (Appendix B.2 and B.3). Because these three types show qualitatively very different
behavioral patterns, key differences in preferences would be hidden with a lower number of
types. It is, however, still interesting to see what happens if we reduce the penalty parameter λ
in the DP-means algorithm such that more than three types emerge. If we reduce λ such that
four types emerge, the different types are characterized by the behavioral patterns displayed
in Figure B.5 below.
In the case of four types we find again an inequality averse type and a predominantly
selfish type but the social welfare type is divided up in a moderate and a strong social wel-
fare type. It is important to keep in mind that we assign these preference labels ex-post, i.e.,
after we have seen the four behavioral clusters because the DP-means algorithm is agnostic
with regard to the preference labels and only “cares” about the creation of behavioral clus-
ters and the assignment of each individual to the nearest behavioral cluster such that each
individual is “sufficiently close” to the cluster’s mean vector. However, a comparison with
the behavioral patterns in case of three types (see Figure 4) quickly reveals that the type that
we label “inequality averse” in case of k = 3 behaves almost identical to the type we label
“inequality averse” in case of k = 4. The same holds for the predominantly selfish type. In
addition, 49.9% of the people are assigned to the inequality averse type and 13.74% to the
predominantly selfish type which is very similar to the 50.8% and the 14.85% in case of three
types.
With k = 4 the social welfare type is now divided up into two types – a moderate (14.6%
of the population) and a strong social welfare type (21.7% of the population). It is justified
to label both of them social welfare types because both almost always choose the selfish (and
total) payoff maximizing allocation for positively sloped budget lines, implying that they have
no willingness to pay to reduce the rich player’s income for the sake of equality. And both
almost always choose the total payoff-maximizing allocation for the vertical budget line (slope
-inf). Yet for the negatively sloped budget lines we see a difference between the moderate and
the strong type. In particular, when altruistic behavior is relatively costly (for slopes -.2, -.5)
the strong type is much more willing to behave altruistically by choosing the central allocation
in the majority of the cases, which justifies the label “strong” for this type. In contrast, the
moderate type chooses the selfish allocation in the vast majority of the cases for these budget
lines. Interestingly, however, when it is very cheap to behave altruistically (for slopes -2 and
-5) the strong type still prefers the central allocation in most of the cases while the moderate
type maximizes the total payoff. Thus, the difference between the strong and the moderate
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Figure B.5: Type-specific behavioral patterns in case of four types (center bundle)
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Type 2: Moderate social welfare concerns - 21.72%
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope of the
budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when moving to the
right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e., benefits) and the benefits
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when moving to the right along the
axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity) the green colored part of a bar indicates
the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for
the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates the relative frequency with which subjects choose one
of the two allocations with the highest payoffs for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of
one of the three central allocations. For the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates
the choice of one of the two most generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels
the choice of one of the two least generous (and total payoff-minimizing) allocations.
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type partly also relates to the relative weights of equality versus “efficiency” (i.e., total payoff)
in their social preferences.
Finally, to document explicitly that in case of k = 4 the social welfare type is divided up
we show the transition matrix for the three and the four-type case in the table below. The
table indicates that almost all individuals assigned to the inequality averse cluster for k = 3
remain in that cluster, and almost all predominantly selfish individuals also remain in “their”
cluster when k = 4. Moreover, each of the individuals in the social welfare cluster in case of
k = 3 remains in one of the two social welfare clusters in case of k = 4.
Table B.2: Transition of individuals between types
k = 4 types
Inequality
averse
Strong
social welfare
concern
Moderate
social welfare
concern
Predominantly
selfish
Total
(%)
k=3
types
Inequality
averse 406 7 1 0
414
(50.8%)
Social welfare
concern 0 162 118 0
280
(34.4%)
Predominantly
selfish 1 8 0 112
121
(14.8%)
Total
(%)
407
(49.9%)
177
(21.7%)
119
(14.6%)
112
(13.8%)
815
(100%)
If we decrease the penalty parameter λ further such that 5 types emerge we basically get
again 4 types that are very similar to those illustrated in Figure B.5 above and they comprise
98.65% of the population, i.e., the fifth type only attracts 1.35% of the population. Similar
remarks apply when we allow for k = 6 types. The fifth and the sixth type only comprise
1.47% of the population. Thus, taken together, the emerging clusters and their associated be-
havioral patterns together with our validation exercises suggest that there are 3 qualitatively
fundamentally distinct social preference types – and these three types basically comprise the
whole population. However, there is some meaningful and interesting heterogeneity among
the social welfare types that justifies that we look deeper into the behavior of this type when
we study certain aspects of the relation between other-regarding preferences and support for
political redistribution.
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B.5 Approximating the type distribution of other-regarding preferences with a
small number of budget lines
We used the 14 budget lines of the center bundle to identify the different preference types
and the distribution of individuals to the types. Is it possible to achieve a reasonably good ap-
proximation of this type classification with a smaller number of budget lines? An affirmative
answer could be very useful for future research because the smaller the number of decision
problems necessary for identifying the type distribution the easier it is to integrate the money
allocation game into surveys. Therefore, we have examined the extent to which subjects are
mis-assigned relative to clustering results with the 14 center budget lines when we restrict
the application of the DP-means algorithm to 2, 3, 4 or 5 budget lines. For example, for the
case of only two budget lines we ask which two among the 14 budget lines yield the smallest
misclassification relative to the full set of 14 budget lines. We quantify the misclassification by
the relative share of people in the overall sample that is assigned to a different type relative
to the type assignment achieved with the 14 budget lines.
When we restrict attention to only 2 budget lines, the two budget lines providing the
smallest error relative to all 14 budget lines are associated with 17.6% of misclassified subjects.
For three, four and five budget lines the error-minimizing subset of budget lines is associated
with misclassification shares of 13.6%, 10.3% and 7.9%, respectively. These number indicate
that a lot of information about individuals’ preferences is already contained in a relatively
small set of budget lines.
The best subset of budget lines when we restrict attention to only 5 budget lines is il-
lustrated in Figure B.6 below. Interestingly, the vertical and the horizontal budget line are
included in this subset along with two negatively slope and one positively sloped budget
line. Intuitively, the flat and the positively sloped budget line help us to separate the in-
equality averse from the other subjects because the inequality averse subjects will tend to
choose the central allocation for these budget lines. And the steep negatively sloped budget
lines help us to separate those with an altruistic concern for social welfare from the other
individuals because those with a concern for social welfare will to a large extent choose the
own-payoff minimizing (i.e., total payoff maximizing) allocation for these budget lines. Fi-
nally, the predominantly selfish individuals are separated from the others with the help of
both the negatively and the positively sloped budget lines because they will deviate from the
inequality averse type for the positively sloped and from both other social preference types
for the negatively sloped budget lines.
Figure B.6 also illustrates the behavioral patterns of the three types derived on the basis
of the decisions for the five selected budget lines. The type-specific behavioral patterns in this
figure are remarkably similar to the types’ behavior in Figure 4 in the main paper (where the
types are identified on the basis of 14 budget lines).
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In some sense, this is not surprising given that we have only 7.9% of mis-assigned sub-
jects. We show the pattern of mis-assignment in Table B.3 below. The table shows a re-
markably good approximation of type assignment and an equally remarkable stability in the
population shares of the three types. In total, only 64 of the 815 individuals in our sample are
assigned to a different group and the population share of the inequality averse type remains
the same under the clustering with 5 budget lines; the population share of the social welfare
type is slightly smaller and the share of the predominantly selfish type is slightly larger with
5 budget lines. In Appendix C.5 we will also show that the association between social prefer-
ences and political support for redistribution is also quite robust to the substantial reduction
of budget lines from 14 to 5.
Table B.3: Transition of individuals between types
Clustering based on 5 budget lines
Inequality
averse
Social welfare
concern
Predominantly
selfish
Total
(%)
Clustering
based
on 14
budget
lines
Inequality
averse 385 21 8
414
(50.8%)
Social welfare
concern 23 252 5
280
(34.4%)
Predominantly
selfish 6 1 114
121
(14.8%)
Total
(%)
414
(50.8%)
274
(33.6%)
127
(15.6%)
815
(100%)
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Figure B.6: Type-specific behavioral pattern when clustering is based on the 5 most informa-
tive budget lines
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the cost of increasing the other participant’s payoff (i.e., the slope of the
budget line). For negatively sloped budget lines these costs are positive and increasing (when moving to the
right along the axis). For positively sloped budget lines these costs are negative (i.e., benefits) and the benefits
of increasing the other participant’s payoff by one unit are decreasing (when moving to the right along the
axis). For all budget lines except the vertical one (with slope –infinity) the green colored part of a bar indicates
the relative frequency with which the subjects choose one of the two allocations with the lowest payoffs for
the decision-maker while the red colored part indicates the relative frequency with which subjects choose one
of the two allocations with the highest payoffs for the decision-maker. Blue indicates the relative frequency of
one of the three central allocations. For the vertical budget line (with slope -infinity), the green color indicates
the choice of one of the two most generous (and total payoff-maximizing) allocations while the red color labels
the choice of one of the two least generous (and total payoff-minimizing) allocations.
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C Material related to the role of other-regarding preferences in the
political support for redistribution
C.1 Assessing the role of other-regarding preferences when restricting the sub-
jects pool to individuals who successfully passed either both or at least one
attention check
In order to examine the subjects’ attentiveness in the online survey, we added 2 attention
checks to the survey (one in the first half and one at the later part of the survey). In our
sample, data quality is remarkably high: 76% of the subjects correctly answered both attention
checks, and only 11% failed to pass both checks. A comparison of Tables C.1 and C.2 with
Table 2 in the paper shows that, if anything, other-regarding preferences play an even stronger
role if we exclude individuals who did not pass one or both attention checks.
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Table C.1: Social preferences and aggregate political support for redistribution amongst indi-
viduals that successfully passed both attention checks
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.130∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Inequality averse 0.149∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Income: above-median -0.077∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Male -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.018
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Age 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Have been unemployed in past 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.024
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.019 0.034
(0.030) (0.030)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.021 -0.008
(0.027) (0.027)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.013
(0.015)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.036∗
(0.021)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.066∗∗
(0.027)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.063∗∗∗
(0.018)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.009
(0.026)
Constant 0.307∗ 0.312∗ 0.316∗ 0.331
(0.161) (0.165) (0.168) (0.215)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.121 0.133 0.135 0.174
Observations 619 617 617 617
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other socio-
demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language
is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether the re-
spondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest
educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occu-
pation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is
unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4 also control for subjects’ risk aversion,
patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in people (“other preference measures and general
trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Social preferences and aggregate political support for redistribution amongst indi-
viduals that successfully passed at least one attention check
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.113∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Inequality averse 0.116∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Income: above-median -0.080∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Male -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.011
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Age 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Have been unemployed in past 0.052∗ 0.052∗ 0.053∗ 0.036
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.026 0.036
(0.028) (0.028)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.013 -0.002
(0.025) (0.025)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.011
(0.014)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.027
(0.020)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.079∗∗∗
(0.024)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.060∗∗∗
(0.017)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.011
(0.025)
Constant 0.332∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.412∗∗
(0.149) (0.151) (0.154) (0.194)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.100 0.111 0.112 0.154
Observations 717 715 715 715
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other socio-
demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language
is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether the re-
spondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest
educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occu-
pation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is
unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4 also control for subjects’ risk aversion,
patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in people (“other preference measures and general
trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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C.2 Assessing the role of other-regarding preferences with multinomial logit es-
timates
In this section, we document the results of the estimation of equation (3) using an ordered
logistic regression. In the tables and the figures below, we display the marginal effects of
inequality aversion and social welfare concerns as well as important socio-demographic co-
variates on an individual’s aggregate support for redistribution, where AS can take seven
possible values ranging from 0 (did not support any redistributive policy for which the indi-
vidual had well-defined preferences) to 1 (supported all the redistributive policies for which
the individual had well-defined preferences). The estimated model includes the full set of
controls (i.e. it corresponds to regression (4) in Table 2).
Table C.3 and Figure C.1 indicate that, compared to predominantly selfish individuals,
inequality averse individuals and those with a concern for social welfare are less likely to
show low support for redistribution (AS ≤ 0.66), but are more likely to be highly supportive of
redistribution (AS=0.75 or AS=1). Table C.4 and Figure C.2 confirms that the effect of other-
regarding preferences predominantly shows up among individuals with an income above the
median.
Table C.3: Marginal effects of other-regarding preferences and main covariates in an ordered
logistic regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AS=0 AS=0.25 AS=0.33 AS=0.5 AS=0.66 AS=0.75 AS=1
Social welfare concerns -0.029∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.008∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.052)
Inequality averse -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.003) (0.008) (0.046)
Male 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.036)
Have been unemployed in past -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.015 -0.003 0.006 0.046
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.034)
Income: above-median 0.029∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.035)
Observations 810 810 810 810 810 810 810
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure C.1: Marginal effects of other-regarding preferences (CSW = concern for social welfare,
IA = Inequality aversion) on aggregate support for redistribution.
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Table C.4: Marginal effects of other-regarding preferences and main covariates in an ordered
logistic regression, depending on income level. AM (BM) indicate estimates for subjects with
above-median (below-median) income.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AS=0 AS=0.25 AS=0.33 AS=0.5 AS=0.66 AS=0.75 AS=1
Social welfare concerns [AM] -0.058∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.051∗ -0.006 0.035∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.009) (0.026) (0.005) (0.016) (0.077)
Social welfare concerns [BM] -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 -0.023 -0.012 0.001 0.060
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.032) (0.017) (0.003) (0.088)
Inequality averse [AM] -0.091∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.006 0.057∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.009) (0.022) (0.004) (0.021) (0.067)
Inequality averse [BM] -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 0.001 0.035
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.031) (0.015) (0.004) (0.081)
Male [AM] 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.006) (0.018) (0.002) (0.016) (0.054)
Male [BM] -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.002) (0.059)
Have been unemployed in past [AM] -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.006) (0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.053)
Have been unemployed in past [BM] -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.017 -0.009 0.001 0.045
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.021) (0.011) (0.002) (0.057)
Observations below-median income [BM] 363 363 363 363 363 363 363
Observations above-median income [AM] 366 366 366 366 366 366 366
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure C.2: Marginal effects of other-regarding preferences (CSW = concern for social welfare,
IA = Inequality aversion) on aggregate support for redistribution.
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C.3 The role of other-regarding preferences under within-type heterogeneity
Table C.5 below shows how other-regarding preferences are related to the aggregate political
support for redistribution when there are 4 preference types (as discussed in Appendix B.4),
i.e., when the social welfare type, which comprises roughly 36% of our population is split up
in those who are strongly concerned about social welfare (≈21%) and those with a moderate
social welfare concern (≈15%). The table shows that in all specifications the strong type is
significantly more likely to support redistribution while the moderate type is not significantly
different from the predominantly selfish type in terms of support for redistribution.
Table C.6 examines the role of within-type preference variations at the individual level.
For this purpose, we construct – for each preference type – a variable that measures the
behavioral deviation of individuals from the type’s typical behavior in the money allocation
task. We have described the construction of these deviation measures in Section 4.3 of the
paper. Recall that they are based on the extent to which each subject’s median choice deviates
from the mean of all median choices of the type to which the subject belongs.
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Table C.5: Main regressions when allowing for 4 preferences types
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong social welfare concerns 0.113∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Moderate social welfare concerns 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.059
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Inequality averse 0.113∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Income: above-median -0.070∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Male -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.011
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Have been unemployed in past 0.055∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.027 0.038
(0.027) (0.026)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.001 0.009
(0.024) (0.023)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.007
(0.013)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.031∗
(0.018)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.076∗∗∗
(0.022)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.016)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.017
(0.023)
Constant 0.323∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.408∗∗
(0.140) (0.141) (0.144) (0.185)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.085 0.097 0.098 0.133
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other
socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native
language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a
respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school,
university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has
a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4
also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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In Table C.6 we use these individual-level deviation measures as additional regressors to
study the role of within-type preference deviations for the political support for redistribution
by interacting the deviation measures with the dummies of their respective types. Table
C.6 below reports the results of these regressions. They show that neither for the selfish
type nor for the inequality averse type within type variation matters because the interaction
terms are clearly insignificant. Individuals with a concern for social welfare who are more
altruistic tend to be more in support of redistribution. An increase in ∆i,SW by one standard
deviation increases support for redistribution by 2-2.5 percentage points but the significance
of the individual within-type variation vanishes if we control for the other determinants of
redistribution.33
33The standard deviation of ∆i,SW equals 0.11. The coefficient of ∆i,SW in Table C.6 measures the effect of
moving the variable from 0 to 1. Thus, taking the coefficient of column (4), an increase of ∆i,SW by 0.11 increases
support for political redistribution by (0.11)(0.192) = 0.021.
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Table C.6: Main regression when controlling for individual-level within-type heterogeneity
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.094∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Inequality averse 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Income: above-median -0.068∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Male -0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.012
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Age 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Have been unemployed in past 0.055∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.027 0.037
(0.027) (0.026)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.000 0.009
(0.024) (0.023)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.006
(0.013)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.032∗
(0.018)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.077∗∗∗
(0.022)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.016)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.016
(0.023)
Constant 0.321∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.409∗∗
(0.140) (0.142) (0.144) (0.186)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.085 0.096 0.097 0.132
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other
socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native
language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a
respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school,
university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has
a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4
also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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C.4 The role of other-regarding preferences when controlling for political atti-
tudes
In this appendix we regress aggregate political support on the same list of variables as in
Table 2 of the main text but we control, in addition, for individuals’ political identity which
is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means far left and 10 means far right. The stan-
dard deviation of this measure is 2.02. Table C.7 shows the regressions based on 3 different
preference types. Table C.8 has still 3 fundamentally different preference types but the social
welfare type is divided up in a moderate and a strong version of that type. Individuals who
are one standard deviation further to the left are roughly 13 percentage points more likely to
support redistribution. However, both inequality aversion (as indicated by both tables) and
strong social welfare concerns (as indicated by Table C.8) still remain robust predictors of
support for redistribution when we control for political identity.
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Table C.7: Main regression with 3 types when controlling for political attitude
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare concerns 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.049
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Inequality averse 0.087∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Income: above-median -0.065∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Political spectrum (1. Left, 10. Right) -0.065∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.037 0.032 0.033 0.024
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age 0.010∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Have been unemployed in past 0.037 0.027 0.024 0.018
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.021 0.029
(0.025) (0.025)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.021 0.023
(0.022) (0.022)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) -0.003
(0.012)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.036∗∗
(0.016)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.037∗
(0.021)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.029∗∗
(0.014)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.003
(0.022)
Constant 0.693∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.136) (0.137) (0.169)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.235 0.247 0.249 0.263
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other
socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native
language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a
respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school,
university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has
a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4
also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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Table C.8: Main regression with 4 types when controlling for political attitude
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong social welfare concerns 0.079∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.079∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Moderate social welfare concerns 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.016
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Inequality averse 0.088∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Income: above-median -0.068∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Political spectrum (1. Left, 10. Right) -0.065∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.038 0.033 0.034 0.025
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age 0.010∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Have been unemployed in past 0.036 0.027 0.024 0.018
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.022 0.029
(0.025) (0.025)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.021 0.023
(0.022) (0.022)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) -0.002
(0.012)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.035∗∗
(0.016)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.035∗
(0.021)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.029∗∗
(0.014)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.004
(0.022)
Constant 0.699∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.135) (0.137) (0.169)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.239 0.250 0.252 0.266
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other
socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native
language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a
respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school,
university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has
a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4
also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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C.5 The role of other-regarding preferences in different individual initiatives
when we allow for two social welfare types
In the main paper, we have shown in Table 5 how social preferences are associated with
political support for redistribution in “reduce income of the rich” and “help the worse off”
initiatives when there are 3 types. As shown in Appendix B.4 above there is some meaningful
heterogeneity within the social welfare type – the strong social welfare type is more concerned
about equality while the moderate social welfare type is more concerned about the total pay-
off. When examining the role of social preferences for individual initiatives it may therefore
be insightful if we distinguish between these two variants of a concern for social welfare. We
do this in Table C.9 below. The table shows, in particular, that those with a strong concern
for social welfare are significantly more supportive of initiatives that help those worse off (see
column 4).
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Table C.9: The role of social preferences in initiatives that “reduce the income of the rich”
(“1:20 initiative” and “Fair taxes initiative”) and in initiatives that “help the worse off” (“Min-
imum wage initiative” and “UBI initiative”)
Reduce
income
of the rich 1:20
Fair
Taxes
Help the
worse off
Minimum
Wage UBI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strong social welfare concerns 0.093∗ 0.081 0.070 0.104∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.076
(0.051) (0.058) (0.063) (0.050) (0.060) (0.064)
Moderate social welfare concerns 0.034 0.041 -0.001 0.063 0.055 0.090
(0.058) (0.066) (0.069) (0.055) (0.066) (0.068)
Inequality averse 0.139∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.067 0.010 0.123∗∗
(0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.046) (0.056) (0.056)
Have been unemployed in past 0.034 0.064∗ 0.010 0.040 0.020 0.058
(0.031) (0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.045)
Income: above-median -0.112∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.081∗ -0.045 -0.007 -0.109∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.063∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.027 0.013 0.038
(0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.031 0.021 0.044 -0.013 -0.035 0.012
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.009 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.018
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.038∗ 0.021 0.060∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.061∗∗ -0.037 -0.072∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.058∗∗∗ 0.029 0.101∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.029 0.073∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH -0.008 -0.020 0.024 0.029 0.054 0.020
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.035) (0.039)
Constant 0.383∗ 0.754∗∗∗ -0.132 0.428∗ 0.699∗∗ 0.108
(0.227) (0.251) (0.290) (0.225) (0.271) (0.286)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.130 0.099 0.155 0.115 0.091 0.133
Observations 793 759 683 798 769 721
Notes: OLS regression. In columns 1 (4), the dependent variable is the aggregate support, i.e. the average,
for two initiatives aimed at reducing the income of the rich (helping the worse off). In all the other columns,
the dependent variable equals 1 if the individual supports or “rather supports” the initiative and equals 0 if
the individual is against or “rather against” the initiative. Other socio-demographics include gender, age, age
squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language is french, a dummy indicating
whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent did not disclose his/her
income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory
school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether
the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. Other
preference measures and general trust include controls for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive
reciprocity and general trust in people. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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C.6 The predictive power of other-regarding preferences identified with only 5
budget lines
In section B.5 we have shown that 5 budget lines give us the same three fundamentally dis-
tinct preferences types (compared to when we use 14 budget lines) and enable a remarkably
good approximation of individuals’ assignments to the different types. In this appendix we
use the type distribution identified in the section B.5 to assess the role of social preferences
for political redistribution. For this purpose, we replicate Tables 2, 4, and 5 of the paper in
which the aggregate political support for redistribution or the support for individual initia-
tives is the dependent variable and we include dummies for inequality aversion and concern
for social welfare based on individuals’ type assignment in Section B.5 (along with all the
other covariates). The results are shown in Tables C.10 – C.12 below. The tables show that
the role of inequality aversion for aggregate political support for redistribution is rather ro-
bust with regard to the reduction of budget lines (see Table C.10). Although the coefficients
for inequality aversion are slightly (by roughly 1-1.5 percentage points) lower compared to
Table 2 in the paper they are still substantial and significant at the one percent level. and
the significance of inequality aversion is basically quite similar to the results achieved with
14 budget lines. The coefficients for social welfare concerns are also somewhat lower (again
by 1-1.5 percentage points) relative to Table 2 but still significant in most cases. These results
indicate that the distribution of individuals to the three types based on the information con-
tained in the 5 budget lines shown in Appendix B.5 can be usefully applied and yields very
similar results. At the same time, however, the results also suggest that the type distribution
based on all 14 budget lines yields a sharper and perhaps less noisy separation between the
predominantly selfish individuals and the two other-regarding preference types.
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Table C.10: The predictive power of social preferences derived from five budget lines for
aggregate political support for redistribution
Aggregate support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Concern for those worse off 0.083∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.072∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Inequality averse 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Income: above-median -0.067∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Have been unemployed in past 0.055∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.028 0.038
(0.027) (0.027)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.003 0.011
(0.024) (0.023)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.007
(0.013)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.032∗
(0.018)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.079∗∗∗
(0.022)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.048∗∗∗
(0.016)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH 0.016
(0.023)
Constant 0.333∗∗ 0.333∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.421∗∗
(0.140) (0.141) (0.144) (0.185)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust No Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.081 0.094 0.095 0.130
Observations 812 810 810 810
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Other
socio-demographics include age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native
language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a
respondent’s highest educational achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school,
university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating whether the individual currently has
a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. In addition, regressions 2-4
also control for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity and general trust in
people (“other preference measures and general trust”). Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01
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Table C.11: The predictive power of social preferences derived from five budget lines for
aggregate political support for redistribution (heterogeneity analysis by income level)
Income Relative income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Concern for those worse off 0.076 0.100 0.036 0.124∗∗ 0.122
(0.054) (0.062) (0.074) (0.054) (0.100)
Inequality averse 0.051 0.185∗∗∗ 0.021 0.154∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.053) (0.056) (0.074) (0.048) (0.104)
Have been unemployed in past 0.025 0.012 0.004 0.042 0.046
(0.036) (0.043) (0.048) (0.035) (0.078)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) -0.009 0.032 0.040 0.067∗ -0.040
(0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.037) (0.080)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.036 0.007 0.040 0.008 0.005
(0.034) (0.039) (0.052) (0.032) (0.069)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) -0.003 0.015 0.012 -0.004 0.062
(0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.016) (0.050)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.046∗ 0.036 0.024 0.029 0.105∗
(0.024) (0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.055)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.083∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.036 -0.094∗∗∗ -0.051
(0.027) (0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.069)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.031 0.105∗∗∗ 0.008 0.060
(0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.022) (0.048)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH -0.008 0.009 0.020 0.027 -0.024
(0.033) (0.039) (0.050) (0.031) (0.071)
Constant 0.611∗∗ 0.059 0.459 0.443∗ 0.666
(0.254) (0.341) (0.347) (0.246) (0.615)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.196 0.184 0.264 0.171 0.353
Observations 363 366 204 454 149
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is the aggregate support for redistribution (ASi). Column 1 (2) show the
results for below-median (above-median) income earners. Individuals in column 3 (4,5) report that they believe they earn
less (the same, more) than the average income of individuals of a similar age. Other socio-demographics include gender,
age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent’s native language is french, and a dummy indicating
whether the respondent is married. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational achievement
(compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dummies indicating
whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. Other
preference measures and general trust include controls for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity
and general trust in people. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table C.12: The role of other-regarding preferences derived from five budget lines in initia-
tives that “reduce the income of the rich” and in initiatives that “help the worse off”
Reduce
income
of the rich 1:20
Fair
Taxes
Help the
worse off
Minimum
Wage UBI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Concern for those worse off 0.074 0.067 0.046 0.072 0.053 0.086
(0.047) (0.053) (0.057) (0.046) (0.056) (0.056)
Inequality averse 0.138∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.061 0.033 0.091∗
(0.043) (0.049) (0.053) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054)
Have been unemployed in past 0.032 0.062∗ 0.008 0.039 0.018 0.056
(0.031) (0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.045)
Income: above-median -0.109∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.043 -0.003 -0.110∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047)
Beliefs about future mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.065∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.027 0.013 0.039
(0.031) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033) (0.039) (0.044)
Perceived past mobility: upwardly mobile (dummy) 0.034 0.024 0.048 -0.012 -0.034 0.013
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039)
Perceived inequality (share top/share bottom, z) 0.009 0.016 -0.004 0.005 0.007 0.017
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Mistrust in politicians (1-4) 0.018 0.016 0.024 0.039∗ 0.021 0.061∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
Success under individuals’ control (risk, effort, education) -0.066∗∗ -0.041 -0.080∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.067∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
Success determined by external factors (luck, inheritance) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.028 0.098∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.033 0.068∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
Above-median estimation of absolute number of poor in CH -0.011 -0.022 0.021 0.029 0.053 0.020
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.030) (0.036) (0.039)
Constant 0.393∗ 0.762∗∗∗ -0.085 0.430∗ 0.652∗∗ 0.161
(0.225) (0.248) (0.290) (0.224) (0.269) (0.285)
Other socio-demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other preference measures and general trust Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.129 0.098 0.149 0.113 0.085 0.131
Observations 793 759 683 798 769 721
Notes: OLS regression. In columns 1 (4), the dependent variable is the aggregate support, i.e. the average, for two initiatives
aimed at reducing the income of the rich (helping the worse off). In all the other columns, the dependent variable equals 1
if the individual supports or “rather supports” the initiative and equals 0 if the individual is against or “rather against” the
initiative. Other socio-demographics include gender, age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether the respon-
dent’s native language is french, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is married, and a dummy indicating whether
the respondent did not disclose his/her income. Education includes dummies indicating a respondent’s highest educational
achievement (compulsory school, vocational training, high school, university or other), and occupation includes dummies in-
dicating whether the individual currently has a full-time job, a part-time job, is unemployed or is not in the labor force. Other
preference measures and general trust include controls for subjects’ risk aversion, patience, negative and positive reciprocity
and general trust in people. Levels of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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